

## METROPOLITANISM AND HINTERLAND DECLINE

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Rich man and his poorer brother  
 Stood and looked at one another  
 Till the poor man softly swore:  
 You'd not be rich if I weren't poor.  
 —Bertolt Brecht

This chapter argues for a renewed and more critical view of the metropolis-hinterland relationship, particularly the trend of increasing metropolitanization and the ideology of metropolitanism, which are central features in capitalist globalization and hinterland decline. Today political and media elites commonly tout metropolitan centres as major forces for economic, educational and cultural development, while obscuring the role of the metropolis as a highly concentrated base for the maintenance and expansion of corporate resource exploitation and hinterland decline.

By metropolis I mean broadly a singularly large and powerful city, in terms respectively of population and of corporate and political control. The metropolis (or metropole) has been referred to by other terms, including primate city, chief city, even "world" city; and, for any given country, there is either a single city or a small number that share the central power.<sup>1</sup> In Canada this would be Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and, given the current importance of petroleum corporations, Calgary. In the U.S. this would be New York, as well as Los Angeles, Chicago and Houston. By contrast, there is the hinterland — the back country (or *l'arrière-pays*) — an area of primary supply and tribute outside the commutershed of the metropolis, such as Northern Ontario.<sup>2</sup> Hinterland areas can have their regional metropolitan cities, like the large Northern Ontario mining centre of Sudbury, which typically are centres of production (especially of natural resources and transport) and subordinate administration but not centres of ownership and control.

In the study of metropolitanism, Canadian scholarship has made significant contributions, as in the work of economist Harold Innis and historian J.M.S. Careless (see Voisey 1994 and Davis 1971). In a well-known article, Careless (1954: 17) outlined a key theme:

The rise of the metropolis in general is one of the most striking features of modern Western society. Briefly this implies the emergence of a city of outstanding size to dominate not only its surrounding countryside but other cities and their countrysides, the whole area being organized by the metropolis, through control of communications, trade, and finance, into one economic and social unit that is focussed on the metropolitan "center of dominance" and through it trades with the world. Political activity, too, may often become centred on the metropolis.

London and New York are of course the classic examples of modern metropolitanism. But the metropolitan relationship is a chain, almost a feudal chain of vassalage, wherein one city may stand tributary to a bigger centre and yet be the metropolis of a sizable region of its own.

Here the conception of a "tributary" and subordinate relationship, today obscured in terms like "tertiary service" centres, reflected a more critical view of metropolitanism and owed much to the history of anti-colonialism against the older European and rising U.S. empires. Some studies of the metropolis continue to reflect critical elements such as in notions of "domination" by monopoly power or other means. Thus, Anthony Sutcliffe (1984: 2-3) makes reference to metropolises as outsize, exceptionally large, primate cities, highly connected with international commodity and information flows, having as their main dynamic a specialization in tertiary activities (finance, banking, legal and technical services) and, given this large size, having the advantage of economies of scale for manufacturing activities. From this particular set of features the metropolis tends "to dominate activities taking place within its sphere of influence." The modern metropolises such as London are seen as arising first with the mercantile then colonial systems, so becoming imperial centres, then centres of manufacturing and later of finance. One can question elements of this analysis, but it reflects a common idea that the metropolis gains and maintains its position in a history of unequal or uneven economic and political interactions with the hinterland, distant as well as near.

#### THE IDEOLOGY OF METROPOLITAN SUPERIORITY AND INEVITABILITY

In mainstream economics, metropolitan growth and dominance is viewed largely as inevitable and even progressive, apart perhaps from certain secondary issues, particularly congestion costs. The primary economic explanation and legitimization of metropolitanization is the doctrine of economies of agglomeration, the concept that cities and metropolises grow ever larger because increased size (or scale in population and employment) brings increased efficiencies in production (lower per unit costs).

Propping up this markedly ideological framework is the observation that larger cities have higher average incomes and, since they have higher incomes, they must be more productive. As proclaimed by Mario Polese (2009: 31) of Montreal:



The positive relationship between cities and higher incomes is indisputable. In all nations for which such data are available, cities, especially larger ones, generate a disproportionate share of wealth; the proportion of national income (or product) cities generate is systematically greater than their population share.

Similarly, Richard Florida (2010: 153) of Toronto enthuses: "Large cities are not only faster and more productive, they're also greener."<sup>3</sup>

This link of urban size to higher productivity and higher incomes is simplistic and flawed. The core problem is in equating higher income with productivity, although this is consistent with capitalist ideology — that rich individuals and corporations are rich because they work harder or are more productive. To begin, it is not at all clear that metropolitan centres actually "generate" their higher incomes through productivity.<sup>4</sup> In fact, the finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector that is usually viewed as a central characteristic activity of the metropolis is actually among the least productive of sectors. Statistics Canada studies have shown, for instance, that over extended periods since the 1960s labour productivity growth has been much higher in the characteristic hinterland industries of mining, forestry and agriculture than it has been in FIRE activities (see Baldwin and Gu 2007 and Baldwin et al. 2001).<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the historical decline of employment in agriculture, in absolute numbers since the 1930s, and in mining and forestry since the 1970s, while their output (GDP) continued to grow, actually reflects how highly productive are these hinterland industries.<sup>6</sup>

Second, in the hinterland-metropolis production relation such as for mining, production takes place in the hinterland, but the mass of profits and resource rents flow to owners located outside, mainly in metropolises. Production and ownership are separated geographically as well as by class interest (absentee ownership), and there is no equivalent or counterbalancing flow of profits and rents to resource towns or hinterland areas. The corporate elites centred in the main metropolitan centres receive not only the economic surplus of hinterland industries but also that of metropolitan industries. Much of the domestic flows of income and wealth from hinterland areas to metropolitan centres is generally not measured in official statistics, although it is not surprising in the few studies that do exist to find, for instance, for Canada, that the largest proportions of high-income households (incomes at or above \$250,000) in Canada were located in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary, respectively, and that, relative to their own populations, the highest proportions were found in Toronto and Calgary.<sup>7</sup>

Third, a distinction is needed between urbanization and metropolitanization. Urbanization is usually defined simply as an increased concentration or number of people living in areas defined by a minimum population size and density, such as, respectively, at least one thousand persons and four hundred persons per square kilometre.<sup>8</sup> By such a definition, urbanization could describe a situation with an increasing number of absolute concentrations of population that are of similar

sizes and more or less geographically dispersed, not necessarily a centralization of population into primate cities. In fact, since 1500 and the beginnings of capitalism, not only has the number and average size of cities grown across larger areas of the planet, but so also has the size dispersion of cities and the extreme size of metropolises (Bairoch 1977: Tableau 7).

The mainstream approach typically explains the metropolis-dominated distribution of cities as being the result of a general tendency to some inevitable, naturally or technologically ordered distribution, notably the rank-size distribution (or Zipf's Law). At the regional level, one sees more often the "central place" theory, which similarly reflects a notion of inevitable or natural hierarchy to explain the metropolis-dominated distribution of cities, based on population and minimum efficient scale (in local market size particularly). However, as Sutcliffe (1984: 3) comments, the metropolis

tends to function as more than just a "central place," *serving* the inhabitants of smaller settlements. As a market, a centre of information, and often a locus of political power, it tends to *dominate* activities taking place within its sphere of influence.

Further, metropolises are far more historically varied and changing in their relation with each other and with their hinterland regions, depending on their particular histories of capital accumulation and natural conditions. Relative metropolitan and city size changes include "shrinking" and decline — far from the picture of a more or less static hierarchy. Among the largest cities, for example, Canada has seen the decline of Montreal, long its leading metropolis, relative to Toronto.<sup>9</sup> For the U.S., there is evidence of long periods of deconcentration within and among large cities, absolute decline or "shrinking" of once major cities (such as Detroit), the rise of others (like the oil city of Houston) based on production outside their commutershed and changing employment structures within major cities.<sup>10</sup>

To explain metropolitanization requires understanding the nature of inter-city competition or rivalry with capitalist accumulation. Even mainstream theory might allow, given ever-increasing economies of agglomeration, that inter-city competition could lead to effective monopoly for one or a few cities in each region or country, hence, metropolitan concentration and centralization. However, mainstream theory has not been much interested in what is the nature of the monopoly power of the metropolis relative to other urban or rural areas (such as if this power exploits monopoly profits or rents and population over and above scale efficiencies), let alone other forms of political economic power.

A fourth crucial aspect of the hinterland-metropolis relation is therefore not only narrowly viewed accumulation dynamics but also the historically evolving role of state policy and practices. In the colonial history of Canada and many other countries, this has ranged from the location of forts and garrisons in various inter-imperial rivalries, to the dispossession of Indigenous Peoples, to land and resource

policies and to transportation, industry, trade, tax, tariff, municipal, land-use planning, utility, education, health and environmental policies. Such policies have been a central element in metropolitan expansion and the character of hinterland development, whether in larger state strategies (such as Canada's National Policy) or at the regional level in determining particular forms and directions in resource development, transportation, settlement and the environmental landscape.<sup>11</sup>

As a whole, to understand the hinterland-metropolis relation it is necessary to go deeper than inflated claims about agglomeration to the overriding role of capitalist accumulation and its historically varied, uneven and exploitive processes. At root are the tendencies of concentration and centralization of capital, which are reflected in the processes of urbanization and metropolitanization; together with this, capitalist accumulation contains within it tendencies to impoverishment, which have taken on a particular form in the hinterland-metropolis relation.<sup>12</sup> Further, the internal capitalist dynamics and economic policies within metropolitan centres themselves can modify general accumulation patterns and have major effects on hinterland communities. For instance, the real estate speculation and extraction of commercial and residential housing rents characteristic of large-scale urban development and growth create a sectional class interest that is much larger (for instance, see the FIRE sector in Table 4.3) and more politically powerful than in hinterland communities and that has major effects on urban form, transportation, housing, culture, resource use and related government policies.

The point is not whether agglomeration effects exist — they do exist and have been observed long before Marshall or neoclassical theory<sup>13</sup> — but their role within the larger process of capitalist accumulation and the magnitude of their effects, which are actually modest if not contradictory.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, for a significant part of mainstream economics, agglomeration economies become a general-purpose narrative used in some hands to legitimate and obfuscate a great deal that is wrong with metropolitanization, not least whether the wealth and income of metropolitan areas is tributary or exploitive of the hinterland.

#### THE NEW CRISIS OF HINTERLAND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GROWING LABOUR RESERVE

Elsewhere I have argued that crucial to understanding the recent conditions of mining communities is a new crisis of hinterland economic development (Leadbeater 2008). The new crisis appeared in Canada in the 1970s though there have been earlier crises of long-term decline in hinterland areas, especially in agriculture and the depopulation of farm communities. The well-known boom-bust cyclical crises to which hinterland communities are more vulnerable still continued and were even aggravated by the financialization that has arisen with globalization. But the new crisis is more fundamental: It is a long-term crisis of social and economic decline and it continues today to grind its way through mining and other resource regions.<sup>15</sup>

In brief, five key long-term conditions underlie the new crisis of hinterland development:

1. Massive increases in the global concentration and centralization in corporate mining have shifted the alignment of power between capital and labour further against workers and mining communities.<sup>16</sup>
2. Major increases in productivity have reduced long-term employment in mining, which in turn has reduced the local income from employment flowing into local economies while profits and resource rents flow out.
3. With neo-liberal government policy driven by globalization, governments from conservative to social democratic have enforced privatization, deregulation, cuts to public services, reduced transfer program standards and regressive tax changes, which have had disproportionately negative effects in hinterland areas due to the larger public sector role in employment and transfers in hinterland areas.
4. Renewable resource extraction has reached if not overshoot environmental limits, while mining, which by its nature is non-renewable and unsustainable in each geography, has an extremely high impact on the environment, in terms both of local impacts and global impacts, notably climate change.
5. Mining in the Americas and elsewhere typically has rested on a colonial structure of oppression and exploitation of Indigenous Peoples and their lands and resources; numerous political and legal struggles in Canada and elsewhere presage not only a fundamentally changed division of resource benefits but also more limits to exploitation and possibly new, non-corporate forms of resource management and use.

These political economic features are affecting the form that capitalist wealth accumulation takes in the hinterland and, with it, the process of impoverishment, notably in relatively diminished employment rates, growing mass unemployment and underemployment and out-migration — classic signs of a labour reserve. But resource hinterlands did not begin their capitalist lives as labour reserves marked by economic distress. Typically, mining and other resource communities began in areas to which labour was recruited externally from previously settled or mined areas, with the promise of employment and higher wages. The Indigenous population, on whose lands most activity occurred, were largely excluded from the main recruitment though a small number were able to get hired or contracted, typically in lower skilled employment, without fundamental change to the racial and colonial structures. Despite periodic booms and busts and often harsh and unsafe workplaces, wages overall were actually higher and unemployment lower than the average in Canada. These conditions continued well beyond the initial boom or "rush" period. Even once the largely white resource communities were established with relatively stable work, household and family patterns, the labour force, particularly the younger men, were mobile enough to move to better pay or conditions in other mining or resource operations in other areas. However, the health costs of mining and age discrimination, together with limited training, educational and cultural opportunities, undermined that mobility for many and weakened community-building.

The disparity and diversity of employment conditions between metropolitan and hinterland communities are compared in Table 4.1 using Toronto and a selected group of Ontario mining communities as well as selected mining communities of comparable sizes in other regions of Canada. The table arrays several prominent mining communities in Ontario in 2006 according to their distance from Toronto. It is important to note that the 2006 census occurred during a mineral commodity boom. As is evident, the hinterland communities generally have much lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates, though there are exceptions. Marathon and Red Lake had higher employment rates and median earnings levels than Toronto. This reflects both cyclical price and supply conditions as well as the period in the long-term life cycle in mining, from start-up and early high growth (or “boom town”) conditions to maturity and eventual decline. Some communities are major historic mining centres in decline, such as Cobalt, Elliot Lake and Kirkland Lake. All have significant retirement populations, Elliot Lake especially. Though agglomeration and distance factors play some role in community conditions, they are readily outweighed by local aggregate demand and resource supply and demand conditions.

Historically, agriculture and immigration have been major sources of the labour reserve in Canada. To these now have been added mining and other resource industries in the hinterland. The hinterland has also seen major changes in the labour force participation rate of women (as the male rate declined), which was pressed by economic need and enabled by household technologies and a weakening of the patriarchal family. In hinterland resource towns today it is not unusual to see the local labour force nearly half male and half female, though female wages and other working conditions are, as elsewhere, still not equal to those of men.

## METROPOLITANISM'S DISTORTED LENS ON THE HINTERLAND

A prominent approach of metropolitanism is to explain the inferior conditions of hinterland regions using claims about certain inherent, even static, characteristics of hinterlands. Given the classic hinterland conditions in Northern Ontario, I will illustrate this approach and its distortions using a 2003 policy paper by Edith Slack, Larry Bourne and Meric Gertler, leading scholars in Ontario.<sup>17</sup>

Slack, Bourne and Gertler begin their analysis by dividing the province of Ontario into two distinct regions "in terms of social change and economic vitality." First is the core of central Ontario, which is an extended version of the Greater Toronto Area, plus Ottawa, London and Windsor; then there is the "periphery," which are all the other communities (including Sudbury and Thunder Bay) outside these "main urbanized areas of the province." The core areas combined "captures 100 percent of provincial [population] growth" while their periphery is in relative if not absolute population decline. The authors recognize some variety in the hinterland conditions but then go on to suggest that the hinterland communities not only in Ontario but also in other countries (including Australia, Russia, Israel and the U.S.) tend to share some or all of the following attributes:

Table 4.1 Metropolis-Mining Community Comparisons, Canada, 2006

[illegible]

Table 4.1 *Metropolis-Mining Community Comparisons, Canada, 2006*

	Population	km from Toronto	Employment Rate (%)			Unemployment Rate (%)			Median Earnings (\$)			Transfer income % all inc.	Low income % persons	Median rent \$	Average home value (\$)
			total	male	female	total	male	female	all earners	full-time-full-year	% tftf earners				
Ontario															
Toronto, CMA	5,113,149	0	63.7	69.5	58.4	6.3	6.1	7.4	30,350	45,350	53.0	8.1	18.4	926	403,112
Toronto, C	2,503,281	0	60.1	65.7	55.0	7.6	7.1	8.2	28,675	43,291	50.8	9.2	24.5	914	413,574
Sudbury, CMA	158,258	399	58.1	62.2	54.3	7.8	8.0	7.7	26,793	45,112	48.9	12.6	12.7	626	164,900
Whitefish Lake, FN	349	427	50.0	52.0	46.2	7.4	n/a	n/a	20,032	39,680	44.4	22.8	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cobalt, T	1,229	500	42.4	44.7	40.4	10.6	12.8	8.7	16,883	34,750	39.8	29.8	20.9	560	60,320
Serpent River, FN	340	519	41.2	36.0	46.2	27.6	n/a	n/a	14,976	26,624	33.3	31.0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Elliot Lake, C	11,549	553	33.2	33.7	32.7	13.2	13.8	12.4	16,288	38,256	39.5	30.2	15.5	517	78,057
Kirkland Lake, T	8,248	598	50.8	53.5	48.3	7.5	7.3	7.9	27,587	42,096	51.4	19.8	19.1	450	70,323
Timmins, C	42,997	703	60.9	66.6	55.4	7.1	6.6	7.6	28,428	44,818	52.1	12.9	12.7	600	130,761
Marathon, T	3,863	1,106	69.1	73.3	64.6	6.4	6.2	6.0	33,428	61,601	48.2	8.3	7.0	501	72,905
Red Lake, M	4,526	1,955	71.1	78.7	63.7	5.1	2.9	7.4	33,883	49,196	54.1	9.5	6.7	750	148,976
other Canada		province													
Saguenay, CMA	151,643	QC	54.8	61.0	48.9	8.8	9.6	7.8	23,999	39,996	47.5	15.7	14.2	475	115,583
Cape Breton, RM	102,250	NS	44.8	46.0	43.8	15.9	18.7	13.3	19,058	33,251	42.7	24.8	18.4	570	87,839
Ft McMurray/WBMM	51,496	AB	79.0	87.1	69.4	4.0	2.9	5.6	47,860	74,925	53.9	2.4	7.0	1,425	397,530
Rouyn-Noranda, C	39,924	QC	58.3	61.2	55.5	8.5	9.6	7.2	25,401	38,816	45.6	16.5	13.2	484	103,551



	Population	km from Toronto	Employment Rate (%)			Unemployment Rate (%)			Median Earnings (\$)			Transfer income % all inc.	Low income % persons	Median rent \$	Average home value (\$)
			total	male	female	total	male	female	all earners	full-time-full-year	% ffty earners				
Val-d'Or, C	31,123	QC	60.9	65.2	56.6	7.9	8.8	6.9	26,163	39,242	50.4	15.5	12.7	487	116,981
Theftord Mines, C	25,704	QC	54.2	60.4	48.6	6.3	7.5	5.0	20,691	32,296	47.6	20.7	12.6	416	86,171
Thompson, C	13,446	MB	71.2	77.8	64.3	6.9	5.5	8.6	31,795	47,458	56.5	7.2	15.2	565	128,711
Kitimat, DM	8,987	BC	59.0	67.9	49.6	9.5	8.4	11.1	40,540	67,894	53.8	8.0	8.7	551	115,171
Chibougamau, C	7,563	QC	66.2	69.4	62.7	9.5	11.5	7.3	30,422	45,702	48.9	12.3	8.5	415	100,214
Trail, C	7,237	BC	52.0	58.5	46.2	6.3	7.3	5.1	20,137	45,332	38.8	17.7	12.2	541	142,303
Kimberley, C	6,139	BC	58.5	59.8	57.3	6.8	6.2	6.8	19,876	40,160	38.6	15.4	15.8	586	192,930
Crowsnest Pass, T	5,749	AB	56.2	61.0	50.9	5.7	4.4	7.2	23,824	46,035	49.7	15.5	9.3	608	171,511
Fermont, C	2,633	QC	76.8	94.2	54.7	4.1	0.9	10.4	62,999	70,102	49.3	2.9	1.3	207	48,684
Bell Island/Wabana, T	2,418	NL	38.1	28.5	27.8	27.0	31.2	22.2	11,803	29,166	35.6	40.0	49.9	487	47,219
Esterhazy, T	2,336	SK	56.9	66.3	47.8	5.5	4.5	6.8	30,985	61,328	46.2	12.3	9.2	421	42,870
Buchans, T	761	NL	27.0	28.8	25.4	33.3	26.9	35.7	6,099	36,483	24.6	37.9	16.1	550	35,117
Canada	31,692,897		62.4	67.6	57.5	6.6	6.5	6.6	26,850	41,401	51.0	11.1	15.3	671	263,369
Ontario	12,160,282		62.8	68.1	57.8	6.4	6.0	6.8	29,335	44,748	52.8	9.8	14.7	801	297,479

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census. Low income based on Statistics Canada's low income before tax cut-offs. "n/a" indicates not available or misleading due to rounding. The capitalized abbreviations following area names are geographical definitions from Statistics Canada: CMA refers to Census Metropolitan Area, C to city, FN to First Nation, T to town, M to municipality, DM to district municipality.



small size, in terms of population, market and labour supply; physical isolation from other, particularly larger, urban centres; lack of economic diversification; weak and declining economic base and limited opportunities; high production and servicing costs; limited range of public and private services; small, low-density and often declining rural service hinterland; limited attractiveness for new capital investment and in-migrants; often a harsh climate, and; in some regions and countries, a large native population. (Slack, Bourne and Gertler 2003: 6–8)

These alleged “structural characteristics” are seen as leading to: high levels of dependency; out-migration of young adults; truncated labour markets with few sectors, few employers and a lack of senior management jobs; lower labour force participation rates, especially for females; higher unemployment and labour turnover rates; a bipolar income distribution with many lower-income and marginal workers but only a few higher income workers; and a truncated fiscal base that makes it difficult to support social services, medical facilities, infrastructure, and “cultural and recreational activities that people increasingly expect.” A special target is resource communities where employers “have to pay a wage premium, and perhaps a housing allowance, for certain types of workers, because of the higher costs of living.” This is a variation of a common anti-labour cant that is also taken up by Polèse (2009) as the “Intrusive Rentier Syndrome.”

Though several of the observations have some validity in particular hinterland areas, overall they distort the economic conditions, state role and contribution of hinterland areas to serve a tendentious narrative. In fact, several of their observations could be made of sectors, communities or neighbourhoods in metropolitan areas, as they reflect general capitalist processes that are shared in metropolitan centres and in the hinterland. While there are particular features to capitalist processes and impoverishment in primary industries and regions, which do need to be addressed, these have more to do with the current conditions of capitalist development and globalization than they do with inherent “structural characteristics” of hinterland communities.

To correct metropolitanist distortion it needs emphasis, at the outset, that there is a lot more in common today in capitalist development between hinterland and metropolitan areas than existed decades ago. Consider the economic basis of the class structure. In 1871, shortly after Confederation, the population of Canada was about 3.7 million; the largest city, Montreal, was about 250,000 and over 80 percent of the country’s population was rural, the vast majority being self-employed and directly or indirectly in agriculture (Statistics Canada 1983: sec. A and D). Today, as indicated in Table 4.2, about 88 percent of Canada’s population are employees — wage and salary earners — and a significant portion of the self-employed without paid help are dependent contractors and could be considered workers.

Notable here is the relatively small difference between Toronto and the large hinterland of Northern Ontario: Northern areas have a higher degree of wage and

Table 4.2 Labour Force by Class of Worker, Canada, Ontario, Northern Ontario and Greater Sudbury CMA, 2001

	Canada		Ontario		Toronto CMA		Northeastern Ontario		Northwestern Ontario		Sudbury CMA	
		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)
Total labour force 15+	15,872,070		6,086,815		2,564,585		265,690		119,090		77,640	
Class of worker - Not applicable	295,510		94,050		42,565		5,960		2,430		1,690	
All classes of worker	15,576,565	100	5,992,765	100	2,522,025	100	259,735	100	116,665	100	75,950	100
Employees	13,654,450	87.7	5,286,215	88.2	2,220,370	88.0	232,575	89.5	106,010	90.9	69,700	91.8
Self-employed without paid help	1,130,840	7.3	406,710	6.8	170,480	6.8	15,095	5.8	5,415	4.6	3,230	4.3
Self-employed with paid help	730,350	4.7	278,720	4.7	124,505	4.9	10,975	4.2	4,930	4.2	2,830	3.7
Unpaid family workers	60,920	0.4	21,125	0.4	6,665	0.3	1,105	0.4	305	0.3	190	0.3

Note: Northeastern Ontario includes Greater Sudbury CMA. Not applicable includes unemployed persons 15 years and over who have never worked for pay or in self-employment or who had last worked prior to January 1, 2000 only.

Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census (20% sample data)

Table 4.3 Experienced Labour Force by Industry, 2006 Census

	Canada		Toronto CMA		Sudbury CMA	
	persons	percent	persons	percent	persons	percent
All industries	16,861,180	100	2,758,695	100	79,960	100
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting	523,650	3.1	9,720	0.4	295	0.4
Mining and oil and gas extraction	238,810	1.4	4,660	0.2	5,725	7.2
Utilities	132,950	0.8	16,030	0.6	505	0.6
Construction	1,069,100	6.3	148,895	5.4	5,160	6.5
Manufacturing	2,005,980	11.9	371,270	13.5	4,775	6.0
Wholesale trade	739,305	4.4	166,325	6.0	3,020	3.8
Retail trade	1,917,175	11.4	293,465	10.6	10,285	12.9
Transportation and warehousing	820,195	4.9	140,205	5.1	3,655	4.6
Information and cultural industries	417,325	2.5	101,845	3.7	1,225	1.5
Finance and insurance	689,210	4.1	193,760	7.0	2,195	2.7
Real estate and rental and leasing	303,510	1.8	66,115	2.4	1,135	1.4
Professional, scientific and technical services	1,122,445	6.7	267,625	9.7	3,530	4.4
Management of companies and enterprises	20,530	0.1	5,570	0.2	20	0.0
Administrative and support, waste management, remediation services	722,695	4.3	143,265	5.2	3,815	4.8
Educational services	1,150,535	6.8	172,990	6.3	7,050	8.8
Health care and social assistance	1,716,255	10.2	222,135	8.1	9,940	12.4
Arts, entertainment and recreation	346,310	2.1	55,300	2.0	1,550	1.9
Accommodation and food services	1,126,695	6.7	157,675	5.7	5,615	7.0
Other services (except public administration)	819,880	4.9	127,640	4.6	4,230	5.3
Public administration	978,615	5.8	94,195	3.4	6,215	7.8
subtotals						
primary industries	762,460	4.5	14,380	0.5	6,020	7.5
goods production	3,970,490	23.5	550,575	20.0	16,460	20.6
services production	12,890,690	76.5	2,208,120	80.0	63,500	79.4
finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE)	992,720	5.9	259,875	9.4	3,330	4.2
public and para-public (education, health, social) services	3,845,405	22.8	489,320	17.7	23,205	29.0

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census

salary earnings (a partial indicator of proletarianization in Marxist terms) by about 1 to 4 percent points. Part of the difference reflects a distinguishing feature of the hinterland, the dominance of outside ownership and control. Another distinguishing feature, indicated in Table 4.3 comparing Toronto and Sudbury, is in industrial structure (or the division of labour): hinterland communities have a much higher dependency on primary production.

Second, metropolitanist ideology portrays hinterland areas as high cost or less productive and even technically backward. As noted earlier, primary industries in Canada overall are highly productive — and the profits and resource rents are largely sent elsewhere. The typical situation in the hinterland under globalization today is not that communities are rewarded for that relatively high productivity but that a portion of their population, particularly the sons and daughters, is economically expelled, due largely to lack of employment. The “core-periphery” terminology contributes to this distortion with its connotation that the hinterland is marginal or peripheral in importance when, indeed, its productivity and natural resources are central to the productive capabilities of the whole economy, particularly manufacturing and other sectors, as primary inputs, a transportation corridor and a major source of economic surplus.

Third, the social conditions of hinterland communities are far more varied, complex and changing than the metropolitanist portrayal of hinterland communities as unemployed, poor and dependent. The actual divide between metropolis and hinterland is neither so simple nor structurally fixed. As observed earlier, mining towns and hinterland areas today do generally have lower employment rates (and labour force participation) and higher unemployment, but many resource towns have had higher average incomes, higher levels of employment and lower unemployment, particularly during earlier phases of their development. Similarly, hinterland communities have persons with high and low incomes and these too have changed over time and by locality. Further, even mining communities in decline with overall higher levels of unemployment do not necessarily have higher levels of low income or poverty. Note that Toronto, both the region and more so the city, have generally higher rates of “low income” by the official measure (Table 4.1). Interestingly, the proponents of metropolitanization are not known to promote the argument that metropolitanization increases poverty.

Fourth, consider the criticism of economic dependency. Dependency measures are generally higher in mining towns and hinterland communities compared to the Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) as a whole, though not necessarily compared to central Toronto (or certain areas of Toronto) nor compared to levels in the second largest metropolitan centre in Canada, Montreal.<sup>18</sup> Metropolitanist and class distortions typically focus on (un)employment insurance. It turns out, however, that (un)employment insurance transfers are a relatively small part of the transfer picture even in mining communities with higher unemployment.<sup>19</sup> For example, in 2004, well before the minerals boom, employment insurance

payments were about 11.5 percent of government transfers to Sudbury and 11.8 percent of transfers to Toronto. Of much greater importance than UI/EI have been Canada/Quebec Pension Plan and Old Age Security transfers, which are triggered mainly by age. Even sharper, compared to Canadian or provincial levels or to, say, Toronto, is the need in mining communities for workers compensation, for both genders though even more so for men. For instance, in 2004, as a proportion of total employment income, Sudbury had workers compensation payments at a level more than 2.5 times that for Canada and Ontario and nearly 4 times the level for Toronto. It is difficult to see how concentrating pensioners or health-debilitating industries to metropolitan centres could substantially change the overall economic dependency situation.

Fifth, the metropolitanist view devalues the hinterland for having low incomes and for less higher-income employment or other opportunities, but when hinterland areas might have higher wage-incomes, particularly in unionized resource jobs, these are criticized as high or as reflecting an alleged "intrusive rentier syndrome" (Polèse and Shearmur 2002).<sup>20</sup> Further, one does not find comparable criticism of such higher incomes or rentierism on a much larger scale in the metropolitan centres. As for other opportunities, metropolitanization and neo-liberal policies further increase the scale and concentration of capitalist incomes and wealth in the metropolitan centres, which in turn augments the demand for certain types of goods and services, particularly luxury goods and services. This enables a concentration of patronage and philanthropy in cultural and social institutions that is out of proportion to that available in hinterland communities. For example, a Statistics Canada study found that, even among larger cities, Toronto had nearly a third of the entire cultural labour force of Canada, much higher than its quarter of Canada's labour force (see Coish 2004: Table 2.1).<sup>21</sup> However, such employment depends heavily on the location of public administrative activities and procurement and on state policies, particularly for education, research and culture, transportation and communication. The history of location of high quality universities, cultural and research centres outside metropolitan centres illustrates that metropolitan scale does not inherently prevent such high quality opportunities.<sup>22</sup>

Sixth, it is inferred that hinterland communities are in difficulty in part because of higher proportions of Indigenous persons. In addition to reinforcing racial stereotypes, such a negative association distorts the patterns and causes of hinterland economic difficulties.<sup>23</sup> Nor is it economically a fixed characteristic. In Table 4-1, Thompson, Manitoba, has a higher level of employment, lower unemployment and lower dependency than Toronto — and also a relatively larger Indigenous population. Or one can see the lower level of unemployment in Whitefish relative to Sudbury, or in Serpent River relative to Elliot Lake. In riposte, it might be said that the negative association is merely an accounting matter, reflecting that lower Indigenous incomes reduce the regional average. However, the association is taken as "structural" with allegedly negative effects on hinterland development; and, in

any case, of the several possible lower-income subgroups (women, the disabled, immigrants, youth, aged, etc.), it is not clear why Indigenous Peoples are singled out. For instance, one does not read a claim that women or young or old or disabled persons earn less than the average so the presence of such groups structurally limits the economic development of, say, Toronto. It is difficult to discern any analytical value in the association. Politically, however, it does avoid discussion of colonialism or its consequences and policies to settle long-standing land claims or recognize First Nation sovereignty.

Seventh, the alleged problem of natural conditions such as physical isolation or harsh weather distorts through its subjectivity and lack of clear definition. Modern communications and transportation have greatly reduced isolation in the sense of information and travel times; and the relative harshness of weather, perceived usually as cold winters, are more readily adapted to with technical developments such as in clothing and shelter design. More important, this type of metropolitanist perspective ignores that hinterland populations do find home and thrive in areas far from metropolitan centres, often in areas of great natural beauty or local cultural qualities, as evident, for example, in several growing mountain communities in Alberta and B.C.

Finally, it is important to note that much of the metropolitanist discussion is focused on regional population decline, which is taken to indicate not only economic decline but also that population decline is mainly a regional or local problem. However, Canada has had for three decades a total fertility rate below the replacement level, and slower population growth, even generalized absolute population stagnation or decline, is more likely in future decades. Arguably, part of the "shrinking" now characteristic of many hinterland communities could become more generalized in the future, even to parts or all of metropolitan regions. Though ignored in the Slack, Bourne and Gertler paper, such larger demographic tendencies and their policy implications for the distribution of settlement deserve far more serious reflection.

#### NEO-LIBERAL POLICY AND ALTERNATIVES

Neo-liberal policy, the political expression of globalization, dominates and reinforces metropolitanization and hinterland decline. It is not simply that the metropolitanist belief in the inevitability of metropolitan concentration acts to instill the futility of resistance to hinterland decline, but it is also that state policy, already reflecting and biased for metropolitanization, must further strengthen and support capitalist forces for metropolitanization and hinterland resource dependency. Thus, a major study on eastern Canada claims that such concentration is inherent with industrialization, unalterable by technology and, not surprisingly, its main lesson is the limited impact of public policy on mega-trends.<sup>24</sup> The flip side of metropolitan concentration, the relative and absolute decline of hinterland areas, insofar as it is discussed, is treated in terms of the pace and form of decline and the

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role and degree of financial and program support for declining regions — not on fundamental changes to resource rent and corporate taxes, industrial, regional or transportation policy or greater regional control. Rather, metropolitanist policy sees the hinterland margins as costs to the state to be cut, such as this “hard choices” refrain of Slack, Bourne and Gertler (2003: 32):

Hard choices have to be made. The provincial government cannot provide subsidies to everyone everywhere in the province. Nor can all small communities survive, and provide a reasonable minimum level of services and jobs, within a climate of population and economic decline. The continuing experience of Newfoundland’s outports, in which numerous small and isolated communities have been shut down and their residents relocated, is a case in point.

It is important to note that such views are opposed by a long tradition of more broadly egalitarian and environmentally conscious views of communities, though they are not the focus here. Among the alternatives most fundamentally critical of capitalism and what should replace it is the demand expressed by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848): “Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable distribution of the population over the country” (Marx and Engels 1975: 505).<sup>25</sup>

In the face of long-term crisis or decline, business leaders in hinterland areas at times propose efforts to expand their economies through more aggressive local or regional growth strategies. Such strategies are often presented as a muscular individualistic entrepreneurialism, although typically they involve government policies and funding that is preferential to certain towns, regions or industries to support initiatives such as enterprise zones, call centres, anodyne “buy local” promotions, imported waste disposal, nuclear waste storage or tourist facilities. Such efforts are often smaller in scale, lower-paid, environmentally more hazardous, seasonal or even fly-by-night. Often they place hinterland communities or industries in desperate rivalry with each other. Though individual success stories can be found, the overall magnitude of such business development strategies has been far from sufficient to revive employment or incomes and alter hinterland decline. However, such approaches, often characterized as “local economic development,” do have a certain level of acceptance among neo-liberal policy-makers, arguably as an outlet for hinterland frustration but also because they do not fundamentally alter the neo-liberal policy direction.<sup>26</sup> By contrast, proposals for substantially redistributive policies on resource profits or rents, for expanding local public utility ownership or for major changes in procurement policies to favour local or regional production and ownership come up against strong corporate and governmental resistance, including claims they violate “free trade” treaties such as NAFTA.

More visible are debates on large-scale resource extraction. Here the usual



proposals are to accelerate resource extraction, typically by reducing meaningful public input or environmental controls and increasing government infrastructure and other subsidies, even if the public subsidies substantially reduce or nullify the diminished social net benefits of such projects.<sup>27</sup> For resource corporations and finance capital, the globalization of resource extraction is often seen as a means of diversifying risk. By contrast, for mining and other resource workers and their communities, the current situation is actually one of increased dependency and vulnerability with less power, benefits or corporate accountability. There is actually less likelihood that decline and its social consequences will be solved by more of the same corporate-dominated specialization and dependency, least of all by more rapid or unfettered resource extraction.

At the same time, a state policy of doing little or nothing for regional development in the face of long-term decline is not socially sustainable. With the capitalist adjustment process and especially with neo-liberalism, population decline is a major economic problem. Such decline is associated with impoverishment, lower employment rates, lower incomes, more inequality and poverty, as noted above. The neo-liberal approach is based ultimately on lower wages (and living standards generally) and "mobility" — transfer of the unemployed and poor to metropolitan areas. Yet such a geographical concentration of the unemployed and poor itself has limits because metropolitan centres are beset already by high levels of unemployment and poverty, particularly as impoverishment within metropolitan centres is also increasing under globalization.

By contrast, a more socially and environmentally progressive direction would require a fundamental break with current policies:

- Decolonization: There must be full recognition of Indigenous Peoples' treaty rights and sovereignty, particularly their rights to ownership, use and control of the lands and resources of their territories, including the right to refuse mining or other natural resource extraction. Such rights are stated in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Chapter 26).
- Social rights with regional guarantees: To redress the damage of neo-liberal social policies, there needs to be a strengthening of social programs and rights, with explicit and public minimum service standards in all regions (especially in education, health care and housing), the elimination of regional biases (such as against seasonal work in employment insurance) as well as much increased support for local and regional public transportation and communication, cultural development, local independent media and public libraries.
- Resource revenue sharing and social ownership: Industrial resource extraction, especially of non-renewable resources, needs to be radically transformed to increase the public share of profits and rents, to shift a large portion of these profits and rents to hinterland regions and municipalities and to increase social ownership, control and long-term transparent management of resource extraction.

- Increased regional and local self-sufficiency: To reduce the present trend of dependent specialization, policies are needed to support quality local production in basic social provision and procurement, such as food, housing and construction and energy, to support regionally and locally based co-ops, credit unions and public utilities as well as to require value-added production for resources extracted.
- Environmental restoration: Given that hinterland regions are negatively and disproportionately affected by many aspects of mining and other forms of resource development, including the global impacts of climate change in Northern areas, resource policies must be based on stronger, more transparent regulation, reduced rates of extraction and export, actions against wasteful boom-bust cycles and high-grading, and stabilization and increase of virgin resource prices to include their full costs and encourage the use of recycled materials. Ultimately, the hinterland environment and communities will require economies and economic principles based on limited use of non-renewable as well as renewable resources, including the drastically reduced use of socially less necessary minerals such as gold, diamonds, uranium, coal and potash, to be overcome through less destructive substitutes and means of manufacturing and agriculture. Such limits would respect the needs of future no less than current generations.

Those confronting today's metropolitanist domination can note that, whatever else it may be, the metropolis is a headquarters for corporate capitalist resource exploitation and corporate power. This is also a fundamental feature of globalization and necessary for understanding the deteriorating conditions of hinterland regions domestically as well as internationally.

## NOTES

1. The identification of metropolises requires looking not only at population together with or as proxy for employment but also the flows of capital, surplus and production. In the largest modern European empires, the central metropolises were and continue to include London (in the British Empire), Berlin (German Empire), Madrid (Spanish Empire), Rome (Italian Empire), Paris (French Empire), Vienna (Austro-Hungarian Empire), Brussels (Belgian Empire), Amsterdam (Dutch Empire), Lisbon (Portuguese Empire), Stockholm (Swedish Empire), Copenhagen (Danish Empire).
2. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*, in its Greek origins, *metropolis* referred to "The mother city or parent state of a colony" and, in later use, "The chief town or city of a country (occas. of a province or district), esp. the one which is the seat of government; a capital." On the other hand, *hinterland* comes from the German *hinterland*, from *hinter*- behind + *land* land, and its use in English appeared in the late 1800s. (The related word *foreland* has a longer history going back to at least the 1400s.) *Hinterland* carried the meaning of: "The district behind that lying along the coast (or along the shore of a river); the 'back country.' Also applied spec. to the area lying behind a port, and to the fringe areas of a town or city."

3. Big cities are not necessarily or inevitably "greener" and by some approaches are less green, though the discussion would go beyond the present focus. For more balanced views, see, for example, Smaje (2011) and Rees (2003).
4. Polèse (2009: 149) mentions fleetingly that there is a debate about whether cities create or capture wealth, though this is fundamental to much else and not seriously addressed.
5. Mainstream multifactor productivity results for mining, forestry and agriculture were also higher; for FIRE they were actually negative, as was also the case for petroleum and natural gas extraction. The higher productivity growth for mining, forestry and agriculture relative to FIRE came despite relatively slower output growth (higher output growth is often seen to facilitate productivity improvement). It needs to be noted that output and productivity measurement for services production, not least for the FIRE sector, has more controversy than that for goods production. More critical streams in economics would find the official estimates either miscategorize or overestimate the degree to which aspects of FIRE are services and the productivity involved.
6. See Statistics Canada (1983: section D), Leadbeater (2008), Alasia and Hardie (2011).
7. Murphy, Roberts and Wolfson (2007) found that "Higher-income individuals tend to be middle-aged married males that live in the larger urban centres." Further, these individuals gained a much higher share of their income (especially those with incomes at or above \$250,000 per year) on investments. In 1999, the average net worth of the top 1 percent of families was nearly \$2 million. See also Carroll (2010: Ch. 5).
8. This is the threshold definition long used by Statistics Canada, though in 2010 a dubious decision was made to replace the term "urban area" by "population centre."
9. In Canada, in 2006, about 68 percent of people lived in an urban area of 100,000 population or more, and the three largest areas held 34.4 percent of the population: Toronto held 16.2 percent, Montreal 11.5 percent and Vancouver 6.7 percent. It needs to be noted that such large-scale concentrations do not follow in parallel within their regions — much depends on economic history and structure. For instance, Toronto is 42 percent of the population of Ontario, but Montreal is 48.2 percent of the population of Quebec, Vancouver 51.5 percent of B.C. and Winnipeg, a relatively smaller metropolitan centre (of 694,668 people), is 60.5 percent of the population of Manitoba.
10. See, for example, Kim 1999, Markusen and Schrock 2006, Beauregard 2009.
11. In a large literature, two well-known histories that show clearly the political aspect in regional metropolitan-hinterland impacts in Canada and the U.S. respectively are Nelles (2005) and Cronon (1991).
12. This is described in more detail in Leadbeater 2008. It is beyond this chapter to elaborate here a critique to the dominant neoclassical view of convergence or regional self-balance theories. A useful starting point is Holland (1976).
13. Marx, for example, discussed how the congregation of labour into manufactories, factories and towns, brought by the concentration and centralization of capital, forced a social cooperation and increased productive power: "They find that they are agglomerated. The cooperation which arises from this agglomeration is for them just as much an effect of capital as the agglomeration itself. Their interconnection and their unity lies not in themselves but in capital, or, the social productive power of their labour arising therefrom is a productive power of capital" (Marx and Engels 1988: 255–64).
14. Economies from agglomeration (or geographical concentration) are typically broken down into localization economies and urbanization economies. "Localization econo-

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mies" refers to reductions in unit cost by the geographical concentration of firms of a single industry. "Urbanization economies" refers to reductions in cost from diversification — a variety of industries located in a single city — so this more closely relates to city size. With localization economies, a smaller city could be entirely specialized in a certain industry, or a larger city or metropolis could have it as one of its industries; because urbanization (or cross-industry) economies are associated with diversification rather than specialization, they are thought to be present in a large city or metropolis. Mainstream studies have generally found that while there is evidence of localization economies, there is much less or none for urbanization economies. Baldwin, Brown and Rigby (2008), which finds evidence of localization (or own-industry) effects in manufacturing, provides a recent review of literature. A widely used urban economic textbook observes there is evidence for localization economies but little for urbanization economies — elasticity of productivity with respect to city size is very small (O'Sullivan 2000: 33), without even contending with the issue of income-productivity cleavages. An earlier study by Glaeser et al. (1992) found some evidence to support inter-industry knowledge spillover effects though in a highly qualified way; later work suggests a much larger role in geographical concentrations for "natural" cost advantages, in which are included labour costs and resource availability (Ellison and Glaeser 1999). Kim (1999) has taken a more historical perspective and emphasizes changes in factor endowments over time and a more limited role for agglomeration economies.

15. While I focus on corporate mining and mining communities, the tendencies are paralleled in forestry, rail and other hinterland communities. Of course, each type of mineral or other resource commodity production has its particular features such as capital-labour ratios, technological, labour, geological and ecological conditions that affect the capitalist tendencies noted here.
16. Take the case of Sudbury, the largest hardrock mining centre in Canada. For decades the Inco wage-workers in Sudbury were the vast majority of Inco's mining workforce and numbered at peak well over 20,000. Today, there are under 4,000 unionized employees at Vale (Inco), a small fraction of Vale's over 100,000 employees in over thirty-five countries. Falconbridge similarly had its workers concentrated in Sudbury; today Xtrata has fewer than 1,200 unionized employees in Sudbury, a small fraction of the nearly 40,000 employees (excluding contractors) in nineteen countries. Reflecting largely that shift in power, in the 2000–01 Mine Mill union strike against Falconbridge, for the first time in Sudbury mining history, Falconbridge brought in scab workers.
17. Slack, Bourne and Gertler's paper brings together observations and views commonly held in metropolitanist analysis and policy; I am not attributing to their paper any special gravity or originality. David Robinson first drew my attention to the paper, though the present discussion is entirely my responsibility.
18. Transfer to income ratios (as in Table 1) and economic dependency rates are calculated based on a number of social transfer programs, including not only (Un)Employment Insurance but also the Goods and Services Tax (or Harmonized Sales Tax) Credit, the Canada Child Tax Benefit, the Old Age Security and Net Federal Supplement, the Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan, workers compensation, social assistance and provincial refundable tax credits and family benefits. From the 2006 *Census*, taken during a period of job growth, Statistics Canada reports that Montreal had government transfer income percentages of 12.2 for all those with income, 8.2 for males and 17.8 for females.

19. Based on a custom order of economic dependency profile data from Statistics Canada.
20. This ill-conceived critique nowhere mentions the high productivity of mining labour, nor its high personal or social costs, nor that the labour market is not necessarily local, nor that such wages are important to local demand conditions. As for resource rents, these are inherent to capitalist resource industries and, insofar as unions can obtain some of the rents (it is not clear empirically that they do), these would benefit local demand by reducing the outflow of the bulk of profits and rents from hinterlands.
21. Toronto's cultural labour force was about 6.1 percent of its labour force compared to 0.25 percent for Sudbury.
22. In Canada, the highly regarded Acadia University, Mount Allison University and St. Francis Xavier University are all located in relatively small communities. There exist many such university towns as well as towns with high-level theatre, music, art or research institutions. See also Schimpf and Sereda (2001: 14), who note there are exceptions to the city size related pattern: "Stratford, for example, has a substantial proportion of its workforce engaged in employment related to its annual theatre festival, despite the fact that it is a relatively small city. As well, some very sizeable heritage venues and museums are located in small cities and rural settings, such as the Royal Tyrrell Museum in Drumheller, Alberta and Fortress Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island."
23. Note also that while structural racism and discrimination do exist in hinterland areas and weigh heaviest on Indigenous Peoples themselves, they also exist in metropolitan centres.
24. Polèse and Shearmur (2002) write: "Despite a tradition of public intervention, out-migration from peripheral regions remains a fact in Scandinavia and in Canada, fuelled by more fundamental factors. New information technologies will not change this. Both Canada and Scandinavia have been largely successful in maintaining regional welfare levels. However, this does not appear to have significantly altered long-term job location trends. We should not expect public policy to reverse those trends." The distorting claim of being "largely successful in maintaining regional welfare levels" is one such view, which for Canada at least ignores or downplays not only First Nations conditions (where results are largely unsuccessful) but also evidence on growing unemployment, income decline and inequality within hinterland areas, as well as continuing inequalities in health and education conditions relative to metropolitan centres. See also a review by Bradfield (2002).
25. The editors of Engels' *Collected Works* note that earlier editions read: "Combination of agriculture with industry, promotion and gradual elimination of the contradiction between town and countryside."
26. See, for example, the OECD's Local Economic and Employment Development Programme.
27. A recent example is the Ring of Fire proposal for chromite mining in Northern Ontario by a U.S. mining corporation (Kuyek 2011).

PART 2

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