

# MINING TOWN CRISIS

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GLOBALIZATION, LABOUR AND  
RESISTANCE IN SUDBURY



edited by DAVID LEADBEATER

# MINING TOWN CRISIS

Globalization, Labour, and Resistance  
in Sudbury

*edited by David Leadbeater*

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William Crampton 2007

Sudbury in North America

# Preface

*David Leadbeater*


Sudbury, Canada, is the largest hardrock mining centre in North America and among the largest in the world. The Sudbury Basin region contains one of the world's richest nickel reserves and biggest nickel-copper-platinum group elements mineral deposits. The region is the historical base of two of the world's leading nickel-mining corporations, Inco Ltd., formed in 1886 as the Canadian Copper Company, and Falconbridge Ltd., established in 1928. Between the early 1900s and the 1960s, Sudbury mine workers of these two companies produced well over half the capitalist world's nickel. Based on their Sudbury-generated wealth, Inco and Falconbridge expanded across the globe to become major transnational corporations. In 2006, in a merger mania lubricated by escalating metals prices and profits, both companies were taken over, Inco by Companhia do Vale Rio Doce (CVRD), a Brazilian mining transnational, and Falconbridge by Xstrata Plc, a Swiss mining transnational. (For purposes of this book, we use the names Inco and Falconbridge, which are still commonly used in the community, although their official names are now Vale Inco and Xstrata Nickel.) Sudbury continues to mine and export its non-renewable mineral resources, and rumours and proposals continue to appear about further rounds of corporate takeover and consolidation.

Given that Sudbury is such a world-level centre of mining atop such enormous mineral wealth, one might think it would exude substantial prosperity, with well-provided cultural, educational, health and social-welfare institutions, and a well-maintained and attractive physical infrastructure. But this is far from the Sudbury most people know. Despite doing a major share of the Canadian economy's heavy lifting for well over a century, the Sudbury area *as a community* has relatively little to show for it. Nor is this likely to change — at least as long as the forces of and for corporate globalization continue to direct and dominate Sudbury's economic and political development.

Concerns about community conditions, social change, and future local development motivate this book. We will explore the impact of globalization and corporate power in a hinterland mining town — particularly their effects on working people — as well as how and why resistance has emerged. We will investigate alternative visions that envision a better future. While Sudbury is the book's specific focus, many other mining and resource-dependent communities have been through similar circumstances. There is much in the economic, social, and political experience of Sudbury to learn from.

The focus of the following chapters is on the decades since the 1970s, when globalization began to emerge. This has been a period of traumatic change for many Canadian mining communities: massive job losses, increasing unemploy-





Sudbury in Northern Ontario

ment, poverty, and economic dependency, deteriorating living standards and social programs, and growing social polarization and strife. The current boom in metal prices and production cannot hide the deeper economic and social cleavages forming under the pressures of globalization.

It is not possible to address many important issues and aspects of Sudbury's current life and history within the limits of a single book. The local dimensions of political movements and parties, media concentration, sexual oppression, lesbian-gay-bisexual-trans-gendered rights and family policy, disability history, religious conflict and secularism, immigration and culture, public health, science and arts education, architecture and urban design are some of the many subjects that deserve detailed and critical study. For those who want to explore these and other issues further, several chapters contain references that can be useful points of departure.

Unless otherwise noted, the name "Sudbury" as used in this book refers to the area approximated by the City of Greater Sudbury (formed January 1, 2001) or Statistics Canada's Greater Sudbury Census Metropolitan Area, though boundaries for "the region" have varied over time. This region includes such communities as Azilda, Blezzard Valley, Boninville, Capreol, Chelmsford, Coniston, Copper Cliff, Creighton (now demolished), Dowling, Falconbridge, Frood Mines, Garson, Hanmer, Levack, Lively, Onaping, Val Caron, and Val Thérèse, as well as such amalgamations as Valley East, Nickel Centre, Rayside-Balfour, and Walden. The region also includes at least two First Nations that are politically independent of the City. The region arose as a multi-centred area of geographically separated communities, developed around local mine sites, rail and agricultural infrastructure, and with particular cultural histories different from Sudbury proper. The use of the name "Sudbury" is a convenience and is

not intended to diminish the concerns of smaller communities about regional inequities, forced amalgamations, or bigger-city chauvinism. Most residents, not known for formalism or pretence, do not refer to themselves as Greater Sudburians, and neither does this book.

Any discussion of the region and its name needs to emphasize that in and around the Sudbury area are several First Nations territories, the nearest two being Whitefish Lake First Nation and Wanapitei First Nation. Of course, the whole area was Aboriginal territory prior to colonization. In classic colonial form, the British-Canadian colonial state removed Aboriginal peoples from their lands and concentrated them into "reserves" to facilitate European resource exploitation, settlement, and expansion, particularly after the signing of the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850. Sudbury's name itself reflects that colonial past: it was named in 1883 by a CPR superintendent of construction after his wife's birthplace: Sudbury, England. There is an alternative, indigenous name. The Ojibwe name for Sudbury is N'swakawok (pronounced "swak-a-muk") meaning "where the three roads meet" (Jim Eshkawkogan, personal communication).

This project has benefited from the efforts, support, and knowledge of many individuals active in the Sudbury community, Laurentian University, and the labour movement, especially in the Sudbury and District Labour Council and in Mine Mill Local 598/CAW. Whether for their suggestions, stimulating discussions, manuscript feedback, organizational support, or thoughtful recollections, I would like to acknowledge, in addition to all the chapter contributors, Julian Ammirante, Sandy Bass, Bob Beck, Kaili Beck, Dieter Buse, Carrie Chenier, Pat Chytky, Stuart Cryer, Charles Daviau, Peter Desilets, Buddy Devito, John Filo, Wayne Fulks, Marie-Luce Garceau, Peter Hudyman, Dan Hutchinson, Narasim Katary, Jennifer Keck (now deceased), Gary Kinsman, Joan Kuyek, John Lindsay, Brennain Lloyd, Brian MacLean, Frank Martins, Barbara Marion, Ralph Marion, Brian McDonald, Joanne Morassutti, Jules Paivio, Michèle Parent, Jane Pitblado, Mary Powell, Geoff Rheaume, Oryst Sawchuk, Laura Schatz, Alan Shandro, Daryl Shandro, Mike Solski (now deceased), Michael Southworth, Dave Starbuck, Mercedes Steedman, Mike Stolte, Peter Suschnigg, Jim Tester (now deceased), Terry Thompson, Sue Vanstone, Anne Watelet, Schuyler Webster, Harvey Wyers, and my Davenport friends. Kathleen Lord offered useful suggestions on my Preface and Introduction. Before he died, Ray Stevenson kindly granted me interviews and let me read a valuable section in manuscript form of his memoirs related to Sudbury, where he was a miner, communist, and elected Mine Mill leader. As is the required caveat, none of the above persons can be held responsible for what is said or not said in the following chapters: that responsibility belongs to the editor and the authors of each chapter.

A word about Laurentian University. Despite problems of corporatization and anti-labour bias common to many universities, it has faculty and staff unions and a significant number of faculty and staff members who work to provide a public space for free discussion, library and archival support, research expertise, and educational programs important to the region, including the Labour Studies



program. The Laurentian University Research Fund has helped with funds in support of publication of this book as well as of some of my earlier research on mining communities. In hinterland communities burdened by heavy corporate and media monopoly power and dependency, the social value of such educational and research resources should not be underestimated.

The maps on pages 6, 8, 12, and 180 were produced by William Crumplin, a faculty member in the Department of Geography at Laurentian University. The maps were produced using ESRI ArcGIS 9.2 software and data, under licence, except for the following two sources. In particular, we acknowledge Statistics Canada's permission to use its boundary file for 2006 City of Greater Sudbury (adapted from Statistics Canada Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations Cartographic Boundary Files, Catalogue 92F0166X, reference period), though with the standard provision that "the incorporation of data sourced from Statistics Canada within this product shall not be construed as constituting an endorsement by Statistics Canada of such product." As well, we acknowledge the Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines's permission to reproduce MRD 126-Revised: 1:250 000 Scale Bedrock Geology of Ontario (Ontario Geological Survey, October 2006) © Queen's Printer for Ontario 2006.

During the last nearly two decades I have worked with many members in many unions in the Sudbury area, but I would like to mention with special gratitude the cooperation and support this project and other initiatives have received from Mine Mill Local 598/CAW. Like unions, independent publishers are crucial to sustaining democracy and critical thinking, and I would also like to acknowledge with appreciation the excellent work of the people of Fernwood Publishing, including Brenda Conroy, Cynthia Martin, Debbie Mathers, Scott Milsom, Beverley Rach, Errol Sharpe and John van der Woude. Lastly, and assuredly not least, Jane Leadbeater helped with organization, Kate Leadbeater helped with translation and poetry, and both gave their dad deeper reasons to see this book through.

Much of this book is critical of Sudbury's conditions and its corporate *status quo*. Such a critical stance is needed to develop alternatives to globalization and the corporate agenda, which offer working people, the poor, and youth little but economic insecurity and hardship, few prospects, further political disempowerment, and dollar culture. Sudbury is capable of making needed changes. Though screened out by corporate-dominated media, culture, and education, there is a progressive Sudbury, a Sudbury of working-class and socially progressive traditions, engaged workers, strong women, impassioned young people, feisty elders, free thinkers, and advocates against oppression and for democracy and justice. To this progressive Sudbury, I dedicate this book.

# Introduction

## Sudbury's Crisis of Development and Democracy


*David Leadbeater*

A crisis of economic development and democracy is confronting Sudbury and many other mining and resource towns in Canada's hinterlands. This is not simply about yet another boom-and-bust crisis, and not even about the next bust to come, though that too is a serious issue. This crisis is deeper and longer-term, and the current minerals boom will not end it. It is a chronic crisis of deteriorating living standards and social polarization. It is expressed in persisting high unemployment and economic dependency, deepening poverty, deteriorating working conditions and job quality, declining opportunity, and the outflow of the younger generation. The crisis is felt mainly by working people and their families, the poor, women, and Aboriginal people. It affects not only work and incomes, but also conditions of life outside the workplace, including health, education, community services, and public space.

Tied to the economic crisis is a crisis of the political system, of political democracy. The structures of government have become even less democratic, the rights of working people — the majority — have been diminished, as has access to a democratic media, culture, and education. The political crisis makes it more difficult to achieve solutions to longstanding problems of Aboriginal rights, French-English relations, and gender inequities. One does not hear about the nature of this crisis from the corporations that dominate Sudbury, their compliant media, or Sudbury's subservient political elite — in large part because of the vulnerable and increasingly limited democracy in which the people of Sudbury and other single-industry towns live.

Globalization is at the centre of the crisis. Emerging since the 1970s, globalization has profoundly and adversely affected the conditions of hinterland economic development and democracy, particularly by increasing the power of transnational corporations such as Inco and Falconbridge relative to labour and communities. While capitalism's inherent anti-labour and impoverishing tendencies existed long before globalization, globalization has accelerated these regressive tendencies and widened their impacts on larger numbers of people. As more people are affected by it, the crisis is becoming not only a crisis of labour, the poor, women, minorities, and youth and students, but also a *community* crisis.

Compared to other mining communities, Sudbury is actually better off in some ways, particularly with its relatively high level of public employment and services. If a "best case" could be made in Canada for external corporate mining-dependent development, then Sudbury would likely be its poster child.



Sudbury has massive reserves, a longer history of mining, larger-scale operations, and a more technologically advanced level of capital accumulation than other mining communities. But Sudbury turns out to also have important and current cautionary lessons about development and democracy in hinterland communities. Sudbury itself, and other communities, might want to ask whether Sudbury expresses a form of future development in kind or scale that other communities truly desire.

At the time of writing, the mining industry is revelling in riches from the current minerals boom. Nickel and other metals prices are at historical highs, demand is generally continuing to grow, and a merger mania has driven up mining share prices. For the moment, Sudbury has had a respite from decline and a small increase in employment and population, but fundamental distributional and social problems remain unresolved. Indeed, the merger mania in which Inco sold out to CVRD and Falconbridge to Xstrata reveals, with excruciating clarity, Sudbury's vulnerability to corporate globalization and to its political sidemen and sidewomen in local, provincial, and federal governments.

Discussing the new crisis helps address a related question resonant in Sudbury: why should a community that has produced so much wealth have so little to show for it? Sudbury is the largest hardrock mining centre in North America, it has one of the world's largest nickel reserves and nickel-copper-platinum group elements mineral deposits (Rousell et al. 2002), it has a large, highly skilled, and productive mine and community workforce, and its heavy lifting has supplied many billions of dollars worth of minerals to Canadian and world markets for well over a hundred years. Yet, as Sudbury enters the new century, it has a long-term pattern of below-average employment rates and employment income, high unemployment and poverty, abject homelessness and hunger, poor job prospects, and a continuing drain of younger citizens. And although much is said, rightly, about Sudbury's highly visible "re-greening," the region is still a major centre of environmental degradation and below-average human health conditions.

In fact, Sudbury fares very poorly on most measures of individual and community well-being. The prominent Sperling and Sander (2007) ranking of best cities to live in in Canada ranks Sudbury among the very lowest (26th) of twenty-seven Census Metropolitan Areas. The *Canadian Family* (2005) rating of the family-friendliness of forty-two Canadian cities has Sudbury in the bottom third, including very low marks for air quality, childcare, diversity, and culture. *Maclean's* 2003 health-care rankings of Canadian regions has Sudbury at fifty-second out of fifty-seven regions (it was sixteenth out of sixteen in 1999). A Statistics Canada study has Sudbury in the bottom 15 percent of Census Metropolitan Areas for the importance of the cultural labour force (Coish 2004: 16). And the list could go on.<sup>1</sup>

A key argument of this Introduction is that, for Sudbury and other hinterland communities, an alternative direction of economic and social development is both needed and possible. Social deterioration and community decline are *not* inevitable. But the necessary changes will not come from mining corpora-



tions or the corporate elite as a whole, whose interests since globalization have become even more antagonistic to a majority of the population. Neither is the local business class capable of or interested in leading a fundamental change of direction. The agency for change will have to come from elsewhere, from Sudbury's working people. Why this is and what it means form the main themes that follow.

### Mining Towns and the Hinterland

Given the ongoing litany of inadequacy, inferiority, and blame foisted on hinterland communities, it needs to be emphasized at the outset that problems besetting mining communities in Canada and many other areas are not ones of "underdevelopment." Mining is a highly productive and technologically advanced industry: in fact, it is one of the most productive industries by capitalism's normal standards (CLSC 2004; Dungan 1997). A related distortion is that communities with unionized heavy industry are beset with a "sunset" industry or in a "rust belt" or somehow outmoded in a high-tech and "post-industrial" society. All these suggest backwardness and an inevitability of economic and social decline. Compared to many industries, the mining industry does display itself more visibly — in pollution, in decaying structures, in ghost towns, and in ravaged landscapes and bodies. Some images of mining pollution and devastation have become almost iconic, like the Inco "Superstack," or have been raised to the level of high-priced art, as in the photographs of Edward Burtynsky. Such scars, however, are more a testament to the exploitive power of the mining industry and to its considerable political success in shifting — or externalizing — its social costs onto workers and communities. They express little about Inco's or Falconbridge's ongoing high level of productivity, technological capacity, reserves, or profitability. Indeed, what Sudbury reveals is the impact in hinterland conditions of corporate capitalist development at a very high level. It is the opposite of underdevelopment.

Mining and other resource towns like Sudbury are commonly called "single-industry towns." This term reflects the fact that mining is the main or principal industry, as indicated by the fact that mining accounts for a high percentage of total local employment or of total local income. In recent decades, counts of the number of mining communities in Canada have ranged widely, from fifty-four, based on the percentage of local *employment* in mining, to 150 — nearly three times the first figure — based on the percentage of local *income* from mining (Leadbeater 1998: 3–4). Because mining has higher-than-average wages, a definition that uses income rather than employment tends to increase the number of communities identified as mining-dependent, or "reliant," which can boost the perceived importance of the mining industry. In one recent count, for 2001, Natural Resources Canada used an income definition and identified no fewer than 185 "mining-reliant communities" out of a total of 1,997 resource-reliant communities. (The others were 804 communities reliant on agriculture, 207 on fisheries, 652 on forestry, and 142 on energy, with the last including some

coal-mining communities [NRC 2006b].) Greater Sudbury is classified as “moderately reliant” (30 to 49 percent of employment income from mining), based on its estimated 44 percent of income from mining; by contrast, direct mining employment has fallen to less than 13 percent of total local employment.<sup>2</sup>

Economically, the single-industry mining town exists as social and physical infrastructure, functioning directly or indirectly to support all or part of the mineral extraction process — the mining, milling, smelting, refining, and transportation of minerals. Such towns typically have a number of supporting businesses or industries that provide producer goods and services as inputs to the primary industry, as well as consumer goods and services to the local labour force inside and outside the mining industry.<sup>3</sup> In this sense, the costs of such towns are part of the full costs of mining.

Being a single-industry mining town involves much more than simply a particularly high number or percentage of jobs or income from mining. It implies that the town is specialized to the extent that, as a whole, its population and economic well-being — even its very existence — depends on mining and the local export of minerals. If mining declines, other jobs and the local population also decline. In the extreme, without any of the wages, procurement, or profits derived from the mining industry, local demand and employment would decline to the point of disappearing. This has been the fate of the many “ghost towns” dotting hinterland areas, in which the primary industry closed or moved, and the rest — people, housing, and civic organization — disappeared on its own or, at times, by company fiat. Economists have used “economic base” models to help measure and predict the relationship between mining or primary-sector employment and total employment in single-industry towns and regions. The relationship is approximate and changes over time, altering by industry, local conditions, and public-sector presence, but the general pattern is widely known: as mining (or “base”) employment declines, so does non-mining (or “non-base”) employment, which means the effect on total employment is more than simply the loss of mining jobs, so the effect is “multiplied.”<sup>4</sup>

When a town’s employment declines so too does its population tend to decline. The effect may be delayed and reduced — for instance, by retirees who stay or by government stabilization policies — but a declining quantity or quality of employment will eventually impact population. Indeed, at times even the announcement or expectation of a future closure or layoff is enough for some people to move elsewhere. However, if unemployment is high across the economy, and particularly if there are not many jobs elsewhere in mining, then out-migration is less, so the community and region becomes a classic “labour reserve,” marked by lower employment rates, higher unemployment, lower job turnover, out-migration, higher economic dependency, and poverty. Employment and household conditions have also been sharply marked by the class, gender, and racial hierarchies and segregation of the mining industry.<sup>5</sup>

Single-industry mining towns are also deeply affected by the distribution of “resource rents,” which they produce but largely do not receive. Resource rents

are that part of corporate profit (or revenue net of production costs) over and above an average rate of profit in the industry. Resource rents can be viewed as above-normal or windfall profits. In 2005, Inco's nickel unit cash cost of sales before by-product credits was US\$3.04 per pound.<sup>6</sup> That same year, the average realized price of primary nickel was US\$6.73 per pound, leaving a surplus value per pound of well over US\$3.50. Nickel production costs in Sudbury at both Inco and Falconbridge have tended to be stable or decreasing, and are lower than the industry average. In 2007, the cash price of nickel reached over US\$18 per pound. This big six-fold gap between price and costs — a huge private bonanza from public resources — gives a notion of the magnitude of resource rents that largely flow out of Sudbury and Northern Ontario. Even before the sale to Brazil-based CVRD, over half of Inco's common shareholders were outside Canada. Now, with Inco's shares absorbed and delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange, the outflow of resource rents will likely be even greater.

The vast majority of these mining and other resource towns have developed and continue to exist as part of a hinterland to a particular metropolitan centre or group of centres. The metropolis-hinterland structure is a relation of both economic exploitation and political power that is fundamental to the pattern of regional inequality in Canada. Metropolitan centres are class centres of corporate power, financial control, and tribute, and a disproportionately large part of the profits and resource rents flow to them. For Sudbury, metropolitan power has been concentrated in Toronto and New York and, to a lesser degree, Montréal. The recent Brazilian and Swiss takeovers of Inco and Falconbridge suggest a shift toward metropolitan centres even farther removed.

Hinterland regions like Northern Ontario have a long history of colonialism (Nelles 1974; Coates and Morrison 1992) driven by resource exploitation. For colonizing or metropolitan capital the hinterland is a frontier for exploitation, for Aboriginal people it is a homeland, and for the permanent settler population it becomes a home region in a larger country. Local interests and external capital inevitably collide over the use, ownership, and control of resource wealth. Yet, in Northern Ontario, with over 80 percent of Ontario's land mass and about 800,000 people (about 8 percent of the provincial population), neither Aboriginal peoples nor the settler population have had any substantial degree of ownership or control over the resource wealth directly through their own democratic or sovereign institutions.

When it comes to evaluating the regional and social outcomes of mining-dependent development, the accumulating evidence is increasingly negative. In the United States, Freudenburg and Wilson (2002) conducted one of the broadest reviews of quantitative studies — amassing 301 findings — of the impact of mining on regional outcomes such as income, unemployment, and poverty. Their review concludes: "Until or unless future studies produce dramatically different findings, there appears to be no scientific basis for accepting the widespread, 'obvious' assumption that mining will lead to economic improvement" (549).<sup>7</sup>

For Canada, Stedman et al. (2004) used cross-sectional 1996 census data

on 5,243 census subdivisions (roughly, municipalities), to examine the relation between resource-reliance and community well-being, defined in terms of educational status, five-year migration, family poverty, unemployment, and mean family income. The results were seen to support American research: "Mining places differ very little from rural CSDs [census subdivisions] as a whole: there are no significant differences in education, migration, poverty, and unemployment," except (in 1996) for relatively higher median family income. The point, however, is that such rural areas generally fare worse by such measures than non-rural areas. In an earlier study using community-level census data for 1981 and 1991, Bollman (1999) found that mining areas were associated with relatively lower levels of growth of aggregate community earnings, average earnings per worker, average hourly wage rates, and community employment.<sup>8</sup>

### Development, Labour, and the Heavy Burden of Corporate Mining

Community development in mining towns has been shaped not only by resource dependency but also by a history of monopoly power and highly aggressive and exploitive relations with labour and the environment.

By 1900 the rise of the large-scale, highly capitalized, integrated mining and smelting corporation epitomized by Inco and later Falconbridge was requiring a much increased and relatively stable hourly and salaried workforce. This workforce, initially recruited from outside the Sudbury region, was comprised mainly of anglophones from Ontario, francophones from Québec and Eastern Ontario, and European immigrants (Gaudreau 2003). The source countries of these immigrants varied somewhat over the decades, but the immigrant working population was overwhelmingly white and European — mainly British, Finnish, German, Italian, Polish, and Ukrainian. The labour force soon became self-reproducing. By 1941, about half of Sudbury's population growth came from natural increase (Wallace 1993: 139).

Wage and salary earners and their families long constituted the overwhelming majority of the Sudbury labour force and population. The 2001 census found about 91.8 percent of all those engaged in remunerative activities in Greater Sudbury were waged or salaried employees, compared to averages of about 88.2 percent for Ontario and 87.7 percent for Canada. Of those remaining, about 4.3 percent were self-employed, 3.7 percent were employers, and 0.3 percent were unpaid family workers. The once overwhelmingly male working class had also become almost numerically more equal by gender: in 2001, about 49.0 percent of Sudbury wage and salary earners were female, compared to 48.6 percent for Ontario and 48.3 percent for Canada.

As Table 1 indicates, the population of the Sudbury region and city proper increased substantially in every decade from 1891 until it peaked in the 1970s. Through its own population growth and by annexation, the City of Sudbury grew even more rapidly than the region, to just over half the population in the region. In 1973, the region became a new tier of municipal government, the Regional Municipality of Sudbury.

Table 1: Population of Sudbury Areas, 1891–2006

Census Year	Sudbury Census Division (CD) (Territorial District)		Regional Municipality of Sudbury (RMS), 1973–2001	City of Greater Sudbury, 2001–	City of Sudbury (dissolved 2001)	City of Sudbury as % CD	City of Sudbury as % RMS
	pre-1973 Sudbury CD	post-1973 Sudbury District					
1891	4,842				1,000	20.7	
1901	16,103				2,027	12.6	
1911	29,778				4,150	13.9	
1921	43,029				8,621	20.0	
1931	58,251				18,518	31.8	
1941	80,815				32,203	39.8	
1951	109,590				42,410	38.7	
1956	141,975				46,482	32.7	
1961	165,862				80,120	48.3	
1966	174,102				84,888	48.8	
1971	198,079	29,031	169,580		90,535	45.7	53.4
1976	194,983	27,287	167,705		97,604	50.1	58.2
1981	186,847	27,068	159,779		91,829	49.1	57.5
1986	178,241	25,771	152,470		88,715	49.8	58.2
1991	187,388	26,178	161,210		92,884	49.6	57.6
1996	187,880	23,831	164,049	165,336	92,059	49.0	56.1
2001	176,814	22,894	153,920	155,219	85,354	48.3	55.5
2006		21,392		157,219			
2001 land area (km <sup>2</sup> )		38,350.5	3,365.0	3,354.3	262.7		
density (pop/km <sup>2</sup> )		0.6	46.1	46.3	324.9		

*Note:* Of the three main geographical reference areas for Sudbury, the largest has been the Sudbury Territorial District, which originally comprised the village, town, and then City of Sudbury, as well as communities as far north as Chapeau, as far west as Espanola, Massey, and Webbwood, as far south as Killarney, and as far east as Markstay, St. Charles, and Warren. The next largest was established when the Regional Municipality of Sudbury was carved out of the Sudbury District that surrounded it. The Regional Municipality included the City of Sudbury and the then towns of Capreol, Nickel Centre, Onaping Falls, Rayside-Balfour, Valley East, and Walden. The third is Sudbury proper, which was first settled in 1883, incorporated as a town in 1893, then as a city in 1930. The forced amalgamation effected January 1, 2001, which dissolved the City of Sudbury and other municipalities, made a single-tier municipality covering an area approximating that of the Regional Municipality. Both Statistics Canada's Census Metropolitan Area for Greater Sudbury and its current Sudbury Census Division approximate the



Sudbury's growth came with very high costs. Among the more visible ones were many mine deaths and injuries, degraded environmental conditions, periodic layoffs, and inadequate health, educational, and cultural services. This occurred despite decades of high profits, expansion, and monopoly power — favourable conditions for any industry. One reaction to such criticism of Inco or other mining corporations has been that its behaviour is simply typical of any capitalist mining corporation, and that if Sudbury or any community wants jobs, then this is what one must expect and accept, however reluctantly. This is the classic "TINA" notion — "There Is No Alternative." No doubt there are some strong common tendencies in corporate behaviour — private profit maximization above all — but this does not mean that every existing corporate action is the only or best possible action, nor that the individuals running corporations are absolved of the consequences of their individual or corporate decisions. Comparative analysis across communities and countries shows that — even among mining corporations, as among other capitalist industries — there is a range of possible actions, whether on wages, health and safety, environmental regulation, gender equity, or taxation. Some are better or worse for labour, and some are better or worse for communities. Some actions, such as those with devastating impacts on human health and the environment, are more characteristic of mining or the mining industry, though this too can and has been changed to a significant degree. Some actions are also specific to Inco, which, even by the low social standards of capitalist ethical norms, has become recognized as an extreme case. As Inco's policies were bludgeoning Sudbury in the late 1970s, a leading corporate publication could run a cover story on "The Arrogance of Inco" (Ross, V. 1979). Ironically, the TINA flim-flam not only denies the major social achievements of unions and of environmental and other organizations critical of corporate mining, it also diminishes the efforts of those conscientious managers, geologists, engineers, and other staff who have not followed lockstep behind anti-social corporate policies.

Nonetheless, there are inherent class interests and tendencies in corporate mining that are expressed continually in a range of patterned actions that have debilitating consequences for workers and hinterland communities. Unions, environmental groups, and writers such as John Deverell (1975), Jamie Swift (1977), and Mick Lowe (1998) have documented Inco's and Falconbridge's numerous and continuing legal and contractual violations, destructions, and

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City of Greater Sudbury. In 2001, the Census Metropolitan Area had a population of 155,601 and land area of 3,536.1 square kilometres, while the Census District had 155,268 and 3,365.0, respectively. Sources: Sudbury CD: 1891–1971, Census 1951 (Vol. X), Census 1971 (92–702). Sudbury District: Census 1976 (92–804); Census 1981 (93–906); Census 1986 (94–111); Census 1991 (93–305). Estimate totals obtained by adding Sudbury District and RMS populations. RMS: City of Greater Sudbury based on Statistics Canada census data, accessed June 2007 at <<http://www.greatersudbury.ca/content/keyfacts>>. City of Sudbury: 1891, Thomson (1993: 33); 1901–1971, Census 1956 (Bulletin 3-2), Census 1971 (92–702); 1976–2001, City of Greater Sudbury above. Other population, land area, and density data for 1996–2006 from Statistics Canada, Community profiles, accessed June 2007 at <<http://www.statcan.ca/>>.

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anti-social behaviours, in Sudbury and internationally. The pretence trotted out that Inco (or whatever corporate transnational) has a common interest with Sudbury is belied repeatedly by corporate decisions and practices. Here I select four major areas, using the example of Inco, to illustrate that many corporate actions are not merely incidental mistakes or isolated dubious judgements, but are repeated anti-social patterns reflecting the corporate class interest in private profits over workers, community health and the environment, local development, and peace.

First, Inco has shown itself incapable of overcoming its anti-labour interests and roots. From its earliest decades, Inco ran harsh anti-union, anti-democratic, and discriminatory workplaces and company towns. Complaints, union talk, or interest in collective action were met by reprisal and firings.<sup>9</sup> Workers eventually defeated Inco's intimidation, thuggery, and divisiveness and, on February 4, 1944, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Local 598 achieved certification. But this did not end Inco's anti-labour impulse. In the face of Inco's tenacious opposition, unions won major improvements in wages, benefits, health-and-safety conditions, seniority, rights to grievance, protections against discrimination and harassment, and an important political voice in the community. But it took, and continues to take, innumerable grievances, legal battles, political actions, and strikes. Hans Brasch (1997: 5) estimates that, for Inco and Sudbury alone through 1997, strikes and production shutdowns — in 1958, 1966, 1969, 1975, 1978–79, 1982–83, and 1997 — totalled 847 days, nearly two and a half years.

Perhaps the most telling example of corporate class priorities has been the brutal health-and-safety conditions in Inco's underground and surface operations. Between 1890 and 1997, 674 persons were killed, 144 at the Creighton Mine and its surface operations alone (Brasch 1997: 674). Health-and-safety activists often recall Inco's sintering plant, whose horror of cancer and death Inco doggedly refused to recognize, against evidence and precaution. The 1976 independent Ham Royal Commission showed that Inco's injury rates were much higher even than other mining corporations, and conditions were much more dangerous than they had to be. Though Inco is the focus here, it needs to be said that the human consequences at Falconbridge were no less serious — 84 workers have died on the job at Falconbridge (Brian Macdonald, personal communication).

One must also emphasize the dogged unwillingness of Inco to deal with entrenched male domination in its operations (see Mulroy in this volume; Keck and Powell 2006). It is doubtful one could ever measure all the social subordination, loss of opportunity, harassment, and violence women have suffered as a consequence of this continuing social inequality, which has profited the corporation, and has served as a tool of political division among workers (Steedman 2006). Technological changes long ago eliminated whatever arguments could have been made about the "demanding physical conditions" of mining being a barrier to women entering blue-collar mining jobs, though it is not now and never was primarily a matter of physical conditions. For men too, the macho

mentality, maintained in the corporate interest, also does great harm to male bodies (Messing 1995).

Second, Inco's corporate class interest has had a devastating effect on the regional environment and community health. Such environmental questions are not new. In earlier decades, it was evident that Inco's sulphur fumes were destroying local farming. When some farmers sued during the 1910s, Inco relied on establishment courts and on the technique of buying pollution "easements" to continue its destructive practices. This occurred despite the fact that, at the time, less damaging alternatives were not only known but had been implemented elsewhere (Deweese 1992). In later decades, Inco agreed to cover the cost to adjacent residents of repainting their cars corroded by its pollution, but more than a few residents wondered if such pollution could damage auto paint, what might be its damage to human health? After Inco built its Superstack, the tallest free-standing chimney in the world, some claimed it was a sign that the old profits-over-the-environment clash was ending. In fact, the Superstack was built only after major public and governmental pressure, including the passing of Ontario's Clean Air Act in 1967. Although the Superstack helped dissipate Inco's emissions and reduce Sudbury's pollution index, Inco and Falconbridge in 1980 were still releasing over one million tons of emissions annually and were the largest source of acid rain in North America (Buse 1993: 257–58). Even in 2001, Inco was still by far the worst mining polluter in Canada, emitting 704,808 kilograms of poisonous heavy metals, including lead, arsenic, nickel, cadmium, and mercury, and Sudbury was still its major source (EDC 2003).

The full story is still to be told about how successful Inco and corporate mining have been in shifting their costs to the public. In the mid-1970s, a secret federal study estimated the environmental damage done to Sudbury in economic losses, health costs, and reforestation at \$465 million annually. When asked who should pay for the clean-up, Inco replied that it should be paid — though it didn't want to say so openly — by the public (Buse 1993: 258). Indeed, these costs were and continue to be largely paid for by the public, both by governments and by individuals through their health care and other costs, some of which are still not fully appreciated. Despite miserable, life-shortening community health indicators (see Nagarajan in this volume), Sudbury still does not have an independent public accounting of the social costs of the mining industry.

Third, Inco and corporate mining priorities have had a stifling effect on Sudbury's, and on Canada's, industrial development and diversification. From the early days of mining in the region, corporate loyalty has been to the flags of profit and empire, and especially the American empire. Inco has resisted efforts to develop refining and value-added activities in both Sudbury and Canada. At first, Inco threatened to close down its Sudbury operations and shift to New Caledonia if it were forced to locate a refinery in Canada (Nelles 1974: 327). It was not until 1918, in the wake of governmental threats and the scandalous wartime export of nickel to Germany, that Inco built a refinery in Canada, at Port Colborne. Inco did not deign to move its headquarters to Canada until 1972,

to Toronto. Inco's major research centre, Sheridan Park, is located in Southern Ontario, at Mississauga. The centre of its world marketing remains in suburban New Jersey, though the United States currently has no operating nickel mines. In 2005, Inco announced the closure of its Sudbury copper refinery, meaning a loss of 150 well-paid jobs. After many decades, Sudbury still lacks a diversified industrial base, particularly in value-added industries.

Fourth, corporate mining's interests have repeatedly put it on the side of profiting from war and empire. Though not all end-use of nickel has been for military purposes, much has been. In its earliest years, the industry promoted the use of nickel-steel plate for the American and European navies, and it rapidly expanded its interest in the armaments race leading to World War I, and in that war itself. Tanzer (1980: 155–56) observes that in the pre-war armaments race Inco increased its Sudbury production four-fold and averaged a profit rate of 50 percent, with 40 percent of Inco's production going to the German armament business prior to the 1914 outbreak of war. The controversy over Inco's involvement in the export of nickel to Germany during World War I is well known (Bray 1993). Less has been said about its involvement in support of German remilitarization and fascism, which came out in the Nuremberg war-crimes trials.<sup>10</sup> World War II was another boom for Inco, as were both the Korean War and the Cold War. During the Cold War, the American government built up major strategic stockpiles of minerals, including nickel, most of which came from Sudbury. A royal commission study reported that, as of 1955, about 40 percent of all new production was for defence and stockpiling purposes (Davis 1957: 75). There is still no public monitoring of military uses of Canadian nickel and other strategic minerals.

The profit connection to war and empire includes a classic marker of imperialism — securing mineral wealth in foreign countries. There have been numerous reports of Inco's involvement with brutal dictatorships such as in Guatemala and Indonesia, neocolonial settings with limited labour and environmental regulations and enforcement.<sup>11</sup> In 2006, the Sudbury and District Labour Council helped sponsor a visit and exhibition by Marlon Garcia Arriaga, a Guatemalan artist and photographer, part of whose work has documented the genocidal actions of the American-backed Guatemalan governments of the late 1970s and 1980s. Many indigenous Guatemalans believe Inco was complicit in such atrocities.<sup>12</sup>

These four aspects of corporate mining would be a social indictment of corporate mining even in conditions of growing employment and community prosperity. But the new crisis of hinterland development, which offers even fewer benefits to the community, challenges whatever residue of social legitimacy remains of corporate mining, and of development based on it.

### Globalization and the New Crisis

For the metal mining industry, and for hardrock mining communities like Sudbury, most decades from the 1940s to the 1970s saw overall growth, despite periodic booms and busts.<sup>13</sup> Inco's and Falconbridge's monopolistic positions were still

strong. As late as 1961, Canadian sources, which included Inco's Thompson, Manitoba, operations after 1956, still provided about 70 percent of the capitalist world's supply of nickel (Davis 1957: 73). As well, the post-war decades saw a major expansion in government-driven employment and transfer programs, education, health care, social services, transportation, and municipal infrastructure. From a single-industry town, Sudbury — and many other resource towns — became a type of "two-industry" town, maintained by the public sector as well as by mining (Table 2). This two-industry character somewhat reduced, but did not end, dependence on mining employment. It also opened some job opportunities for women, who had been largely excluded from the male-dominated mining industry.

Beginning in the 1970s, however, economic conditions deteriorated sharply. The advanced capitalist countries entered a new phase, one with generally slower growth. Annual GDP growth rates averaging 4.9 percent between 1950 and 1973 fell to 2.6 percent between 1973 and 1989 (Maddison 1991). International competition intensified during this period, and capitalism internationally went through a structural change now commonly called "globalization." Globalization has several features, such as international integration of financial markets, but the one most evident in mining communities and the element on which I focus here is the massive increase in the concentration and centralization of capital, to the point where a relatively small number of transnational corporations have come to dominate production and trade, internationally as well as domestically (Dunning 1997: 16). Transnational corporations still have their ownership bases and control centred in particular countries and metropolitan centres, but a much increased portion of their profits, production, and reserves — for many, a majority, and their largest prospect for expansion — is outside the home country of their ownership base. By 1990, the four largest diversified mining corporations held about 15 percent of capitalization in the mining sector worldwide and, by 2002, about 30 percent (Humphreys 2005). And, the process of concentration and centralization continues. In 2005, before its \$19-billion sale, Inco reported assets of US\$12 billion and had 11,707 employees, while CVRD had assets of US\$22.6 billion and 38,560 employees. In 2006, a matter of months later, CVRD controlled total assets of US\$61.0 billion and had 52,646 employees.

It is the class interest of the main owners of these transnational corporations that is the driving force behind globalization and the package of right-wing government policies — called "neo-liberalism" (and "neo-conservatism" by some) — that has extended and reinforced transnational corporate power. Neo-liberal policies include "free trade," deregulation, subcontracting, privatization of public enterprises, weakened regional policy, and reduced social program standards. The economic and political tendencies of globalization have conjoined in Sudbury and other mining communities to create a new crisis in hinterland development. The following are its five key features.

First, there was an increase in mining productivity so massive that it permitted an absolute reduction in employment while production was maintained or even

Table 2: The Sudbury Labour Force by Industry, 1951-2001

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
<i>All industries (number of persons)</i>	40,326	38,869	59,215	66,140	81,245	77,640
With industry specified	39,826	37,880	58,365	65,840	80,025	75,945
Mining	11,134	12,450	14,755	10,290	8,725	4,840
Other primary (inc. agriculture, forestry)	3,734	271	255	540		545
Manufacturing	8,146	4,998	8,665	7,920	6,345	4,870
Construction	2,923	2,317	5,940	3,360	5,770	4,415
Transport, communication, utilities	3,867	2,488	3,820	4,370	5,235	5,905
Trade (wholesale and retail)	3,851	5,576	8,115	12,040	14,470	12,595
Finance, insurance, real estate	537	994	1,695	2,810	3,585	3,115
Services	5,634	7,129	12,585	19,940	27,805	33,445
Public administration		1,657	2,535	4,570	8,090	6,215
<i>All industries (percent of specified)</i>	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mining	28.0	32.9	25.3	15.6	10.9	6.4
Other primary (inc. agriculture, forestry)	9.4	0.7	0.4	0.8		0.7
Manufacturing	20.5	13.2	14.8	12.0	7.9	6.4
Construction	7.3	6.1	10.2	5.1	7.2	5.8
Transport, communication, utilities	9.7	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.5	7.8
Trade (wholesale and retail)	9.7	14.7	13.9	18.3	18.1	16.6
Finance, insurance, real estate	1.3	2.6	2.9	4.3	4.5	4.1
Services	14.1	18.8	21.6	30.3	34.7	44.0
Public administration		4.4	4.3	6.9	10.1	8.2

*Note:* Smelting and refining is considered primary manufacturing and throughout has been by far the largest component of manufacturing in Sudbury. The "services" category includes public-sector funded health, education and social services as well as private-sector business and personal services. In 1951, public administration is included in services. In 1991, other primary is included in mining. During the period, industry classification has had several small changes, especially for services, so intercensal comparisons must be treated as approximate. Statistics Canada uses the experienced labour force concept. This takes in employee and self-employed persons, including some who are unemployed at the census date but who were recently employed in the industry. For 1961 on, the data are for persons 15 years of age and over; for 1941 and 1951 they are for 14 and over; for 1931 they are for 10 and over. Totals may not appear to add due to rounding. Data for 1961 on are for the Sudbury CMA and, for 1951, are for the Sudbury Census Division. *Source:* Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1951 (Vol 4, Table 18), 1961 (94-519), 1971 (94-757), 1981 (93-966), 1991 (95-349), 2001 (95-239).



increased. Total employment in mining fell absolutely from the 1970s through most of the following decades. Sudbury, at peak in the 1970s, had around 25,000 jobs in mining, but by 1991 it had under 10,000, and it currently has below 6,000. Mining towns were confronted, not only with periodic booms and busts, but with a long-term downward employment trend or, at best, stagnation.

Significant increases in productivity were in process before the decisive shift to globalization in the 1970s (Clement 1981: 112), but the growth of nickel production outside Canada, and outside Inco, increased competitive pressures. Inco and Sudbury's near monopoly (outside the Soviet Union) dropped to a world market share under 20 percent by 2005. Increases in productivity would likely have occurred even under conditions of exclusively national or public rather than international corporate ownership. But the pressures of globalization speeded up technological changes such as dieselization, and managerial pressures reduced staffing and intensified work through such programs as "lean production," "team," and "Six Sigma."

Second, there has been a massive increase in the concentration of capital and monopoly power, both domestically and internationally, which has caused a shift in the balance of power toward the transnational corporations, like Inco and Falconbridge in Sudbury, at the expense of labour and local communities. On one hand, workers and communities face poorer employment conditions, while on the other, capital has, for example, more alternative mines, sources of supply, and additional access to finances. When challenged, capital can more easily threaten to go elsewhere, which further strengthens its already substantial power against even relatively strong unions.

An example of this shift was Falconbridge's 2000–01 strike against Mine Mill/CAW. This marked the first time since unionization where one of the Sudbury mining corporations dared to maintain production using scab labour. The smaller size of the Mine Mill bargaining unit and the new availability of feed from Falconbridge's Raglan mine had weakened the union position even before Falconbridge made use of Conservative pro-scab labour legislation and abusive police power.<sup>14</sup> The Mine Mill/CAW union was able to overcome this hostile situation, but it took a bitter seven-month strike, and for a while the union's existence as an effective force hung in the balance. Falconbridge claimed the strike cost it \$30 million. For the workers and the community, it was much greater. The CAW alone spent nearly \$10 million on strike pay. Despite Falconbridge's anti-social conduct and mismanagement, the corporation's overall reported profits were double those of 1999. This experience also illustrates how the scale of "diversification of risk" by transnational corporations increases costs and reduces accountability to local groups of workers and communities.

Increased corporate concentration and monopoly have gone beyond mining to dominate most parts of the local private sector — from box stores to supermarkets to financial services to hotels and restaurants to fast food to "convenience" stores — whether through directly managed operations, or distributor or franchise arrangements. Though these corporate operations are generally

larger than local businesses, workers have so far been able to unionize only a small number. Weakened bargaining power for workers, whatever the sector, has negative distributional effects, such as lower local wages, poorer working conditions and benefits, decreased employment security, and increasing subcontracting. For the resource sector, it further disadvantaged labour and communities in the distribution of the benefits of productivity gains and also on who shouldered the huge community costs of mining industry "downsizing."

Third, there has been as a major shift in government policy toward cutbacks in social programs and public employment. Even as economic conditions in hinterland areas have deteriorated, federal and provincial governments have reduced standards in a variety of social programs (particularly social assistance and unemployment insurance), weakened labour and collective bargaining standards, eliminated or diminished support for social housing and regional development, privatized a range of public enterprises such as Air Canada, CN, and PetroCanada that are of importance to hinterland areas, reduced funding to education and healthcare, and cut or subcontracted jobs in public administration. The initial sharp edges of cuts were most visible federally under the Mulroney Conservatives (1984–93), the Chrétien Liberals (1993–2003), and also provincially under the Harris Tories (1995–2002). But even the provincial NDP government of Bob Rae (1990–95) shifted toward neo-liberal policies, though less rapidly (Walkom 1994), or saw centre-left policies later reversed (Haddow and Klassen 2006). What has been crucial, however, has been not so much the pace of change as its direction, which has been in a systemically anti-labour and anti-community distributional direction in terms of social program standards, taxation policy, worker rights, and social ownership.

The efforts of neo-liberal governments to reduce access to social programs and to further stigmatize welfare and the poor has hit hard in the high-unemployment hinterland areas. These changes have come as no surprise. With the Liberal federal government's cutbacks to unemployment insurance effected July 1, 1996, it was actually known in advance in Parliament that forestry and mining would be the industries with the two largest cuts to benefits. By 1997, only 33 percent of unemployed workers in Sudbury were receiving benefits (CLC 2005). Sudbury has a large number of injured workers, so the provincial Harris Conservatives' attacks on workers' compensation had major significance. As compensation activist Peter Hudyman recounts, the Conservatives "gutted benefits, reduced retraining, reduced the pensions, contracted out services, the tone changed with the Board, and they eliminated labour representation, made it more difficult to appeal, and got rid of the Occupational Disease Panel" (Hudyman, personal communication July 2007).

Fourth, the growth of resource extraction and consumption has faced more environmental limits, both at the local and national levels. Not only has the number of large, easily accessible mineral deposits diminished, but environmental legal restrictions, health concerns, and conflicts with other industries, such as tourism, have also increased. Further, there has been rising social concern, not

only about local or regional issues such as acid rain, but also about global impacts, most notably climate change. The shift has been reflected in environmentalists' challenges to resource industries such as those brought by organizations like Northwatch and MiningWatch Canada, in stronger environmental policies in the labour movement, and in widening public support for "sustainability." Such resource and societal limits continue to emerge in contradiction to and despite the still-dominant neo-liberal trend.

Fifthly, extensive resource development has faced increased political and legal resistance from Aboriginal peoples over fundamental questions of sovereignty and land claims. The fact that the ownership and governance of resource lands are contested by actual or potential sovereign peoples is not necessarily, in itself, an absolute limit to the expansion of corporate resource exploitation: capitalist mining corporations have long conducted production and export across sovereign frontiers. However, within Canada, as limited as this emerging sovereign power may currently be, it has altered the reach of corporate power and forced a degree of redivision of the profits and economic benefits from resource exploitation. An example of the change since the 1990s is the emergence of so-called "Impacts and Benefits Agreements" negotiated by Aboriginal peoples with mining corporations. The terms of such agreements and the strategy behind them are the subject of some debate, including among Aboriginal peoples themselves, but the existence of such a negotiated process puts Aboriginal peoples ahead of most non-Aboriginals and local and regional governments in challenging the power of mining corporations.

Overall, the new conditions of globalization since the 1970s have fundamentally transformed development prospects for hinterland communities and labour. Not only has the balance of power shifted further away from labour and communities, but simplistic growth policies based on expanded resource extraction have also lost credibility. Resource extraction has either been increasingly constrained by availability or access or, when permitted, has been much more limited in its local employment and income benefits.

### Consequences

The crisis of hinterland development has had adverse long-term consequences for most of Sudbury's people, and it has done so by intensifying the impoverishing tendencies of capitalism. The effects have been numerous, though here I can summarize only some major consequences: employment, unemployment, bankruptcy, economic dependency, relative and absolute poverty, incomes, earnings, and distribution.

There has been a long-term decline in employment rates, in both the quantity as well as the quality of jobs. There have been major losses of higher-paid and unionized jobs, as employment has become more insecure and local prospects have diminished. This has occurred mainly through massive job cuts in the mining industry, but it also occurred in the 1990s with job cuts in the public sector. As can be seen in Table 3, male employment rates shifted sharply downward,

Table 3: Employment and Unemployment Rates for Sudbury, Ontario, and Canada, 1951–2001

	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
<b>Employment rates (%)</b>						
<i>Both sexes</i>						
Sudbury	54.3	54.7	57.2	56.6	59.9	56.3
Ontario	54.1	55.0	57.8	63.4	63.6	63.2
Canada	51.8	52.0	53.4	60.0	61.0	61.5
<i>Males</i>						
Sudbury	84.1	81.1	78.7	70.9	67.0	59.9
Ontario	82.6	78.2	75.4	76.0	70.7	69.1
Canada	80.0	74.9	70.8	73.1	68.6	67.2
<i>Females</i>						
Sudbury	16.7	26.0	33.5	42.7	53.1	52.9
Ontario	25.6	39.1	40.6	51.3	56.9	57.6
Canada	23.1	28.8	36.4	47.3	53.8	56.1
<b>Unemployment rates (%)</b>						
<i>Both sexes</i>						
Sudbury	1.2	3.3	6.2	8.2	8.6	9.2
Ontario	1.0	3.3	6.9	5.6	8.5	6.1
Canada	1.7	3.9	7.9	7.4	10.2	7.4
<i>Males</i>						
Sudbury	1.1	3.1	4.6	6.4	8.2	9.9
Ontario	1.0	3.5	6.0	4.6	8.6	5.8
Canada	1.8	4.2	7.3	6.5	10.1	7.6
<i>Females</i>						
Sudbury	1.7	4.1	10.0	10.8	9.1	8.4
Ontario	1.1	2.8	8.2	6.9	8.4	6.5
Canada	1.6	2.9	8.8	8.7	10.2	7.2

*Note:* The table uses Ontario for comparison, not only because Sudbury is in this jurisdiction, but also because until recently Ontario has been considered one of Canada's two most wealthy, or "have," provinces.  
*Source:* Census of Canada 1951 (Vol. 5, Table 2), 1961 (94–533), 1971 (95–749, 94–772), 1981 (93–966), 1991 (93–338), 2001 (95–220).



from being above or at the average for Ontario and Canada from 1951–71 to below it in 1991 and much below it in 2001. Female employment rates tended to rise over the period until hit with public-sector and service-sector job cuts: however, female employment rates, reflecting the segregating effects of the mining industry, tended to be below the rates for Ontario. Overall, Sudbury went from having a higher employment rate than the average for Canada and one similar to Ontario in 1971, to a situation, in 2001, of more than 5 percentage points below the average for Canada, and even further below the average for Ontario. Though the gap has since narrowed in light of the current mineral boom, the Sudbury employment rate is still below the Ontario and Canadian averages. The Northern Ontario and Northwestern Ontario employment rates are even further behind.

There has been an upward shift in rates of unemployment, for both men and women, but experiences by gender have been different (see Table 3). For men, unemployment rates in the earlier decades were below the averages for Ontario and Canada, but by 1981 rose rapidly above both those averages. For women, the segregating effects of the mining industry led to unemployment rates that were higher than average for Ontario and Canada in all census years, except for 1991 for Ontario, likely due to then increasing public-sector employment. Overall, mining areas like Sudbury became more like other low-employment-high-unemployment hinterland areas.

Bankruptcy rates were also much higher than average. In 2001, Sudbury had about 645 consumer bankruptcies or 4.2 per thousand of population, nearly double the average for Ontario (2.2 per thousand, while Canada was 2.6 per thousand). Business bankruptcies were also significantly higher: 64 or 0.41 per thousand of population compared to 0.27 for Ontario and 0.33 for Canada. Such high levels of bankruptcy have high household and community costs. They are also a salutary warning to those who simplistically promote small business start-ups as the key solution to Sudbury's economic development.

Economic dependency on social programs has increased from below to well above federal and provincial averages. In 2004, the economic dependency rate on government transfers for men for Greater Sudbury was 14.5, compared to 9.3 for Ontario and 10.8 for Canada. For women, the rate was 29.3, compared to 21.2 for Ontario and 24.1 for Canada. These factors help account for the higher rate: lower average labour earnings, more people needing social programs such as unemployment insurance, and, for those using social programs, more benefits were needed, due, for instance, to longer durations of unemployment.

Poverty rates, as indicated by Statistics Canada's Low Income Cut-Off, suggest that Sudbury's overall poverty rates are near average for Ontario and somewhat below the average for Canada (Lee 2000). However, much depends on Sudbury's relatively low rate for older age groups, which is bolstered by Sudbury's large number of retirees living on employer and union-negotiated pension plans. Poverty rates for younger persons (below 35) tend to be higher than average for Ontario and similar to those for Canada. Unattached younger

persons, especially women, have higher rates than both Ontario and Canada. Further, Kauppi (1999) has shown that child poverty rates were higher in Sudbury than both Canada and Ontario (30.2 percent for the City of Sudbury and 22.4 percent for the Sudbury Region in 1996).

Absolute destitution is also substantially present in the midst of Sudbury's enormous mining wealth. Several surveys of homelessness in the early 2000s found that, even using a conservative service-use-based measure, there were nearly 500 homeless persons, and the situation was persisting if not increasing (Kauppi 2002). Hunger and food insecurity is also much greater than is generally appreciated (see Suschnigg in this volume).

As might be expected, higher unemployment, poverty, reduced job quality, and cuts to social program standards have led to both relative and absolute declines in incomes and earnings. In earlier decades, Sudbury and other mining communities tended to have much higher than average wages and incomes. But in 2001, the census estimated average earnings from full- and part-time employment in Sudbury to be \$31,063, about 12 percent lower than Ontario's average and 3 percent lower than Canada's. Women in Sudbury earned about 62 percent of men. Even those who worked full-time and year-round were below the Ontario average and only slightly above the Canadian average. My analysis of income tax return data shows that average real income in Sudbury has either stagnated or declined over most years of the 1990s and into the 2000s. In 1993, real average wage and salary income was \$28,800, higher than the averages for Ontario and Canada, while in 2003, adjusted for inflation, it had dropped to \$24,150, or about 20 percent, to below both the Ontario and Canadian averages. Even in the mining sector, where in the past unions had more bargaining power, analysis of collective agreements shows there was a stagnation of base rates, and even some years of real decline, from the late 1980s to the early 2000s.<sup>15</sup> These earning patterns occurred despite increasing productivity. If one goes beyond market income to include pensions and social-program income, the picture is somewhat better, though only for families: for single parents it is sharply lower. However, market income is generally a clearer long-term indicator of tendencies in the labour market.

Social disparity within Sudbury has also grown. Looking at earned wage and salary income, the disparities are major. In 1993, the lowest 60 percent of earners made 25.9 percent of all earnings, while the highest 20 percent made 47.8 percent. In 2003, the share of the lowest 60 percent had fallen to 21.7 percent, while the highest 20 percent had increased to 51.7 percent — over half of all wage and salary earnings in the community. Even the average of this highest-paid 20 percent declined in real terms and relative to the high-earner average for Ontario and Canada. This reinforces how poorly the majority of Sudbury's wage and salary earners fared. Without social programs, there would have been mass and rapid impoverishment of a kind not seen since the Great Depression. The current boom in mining earnings and bonuses as well as the new medical school and some hospital expansion may alter this pattern for upper incomes,



at least in the short-run, but the disparity will remain large and could increase further.

The above patterns have their human side in many individual and family stories of hardship, loss, and broken hopes of those who have been subjected to the capitalist "adjustment" process in hinterland areas. Neo-liberal cuts to social program are making the consequences worse, even deadly, such as in the tragic case of Kimberly Rogers (see Kuyek in this volume).

### Democracy and Merger Mania

Globalization is having a destructive effect on democracy, including local democracy, which is especially important in mining communities, where corporate power is more concentrated and where the local business class has tended to collaborate with the transnational corporate agenda.

Sudbury is a class-divided community with a deep experience of struggle between labour and capital. To paraphrase Marx's well-known observation, the history of Sudbury has been a history of class struggle. The complex and clashing forces of the mining corporations, the local business class, and labour are central to understanding community power in Sudbury as well as the direction of local development and well-being. On the face of it, mining communities have an interest in strong unions: union bargaining power redistributes a portion of the benefits of mining productivity increases and resource rents not only to union members but to the larger community. More money in pockets and purses increases local demand for the goods and services of local businesses and, through increased tax revenues, improves public services. Union gains also exercise an upward pressure on the wages, benefits, and workplace rights of other workers, which some local employers actively resist. Sudbury unions have seen numerous examples of material and moral support from some individual local business owners, but they have also seen examples of local businesses fighting union recognition, harassing union supporters, using scabs to break strikes, and other typical and often illegal measures to deny workers' rights.

In municipal politics, the community interest of labour and local business sometimes converges against transnational corporate interests. In 2005, under pressure from the labour movement, City Council felt compelled to assert a community interest and declared its opposition, by resolution, to Inco's closure of the Copper Refinery and the loss of 150 jobs. However, more often the corporate class interest reasserts itself against local labour and the community interest. A majority of Council a year earlier supported a strike against its own workers at Greater Sudbury Utilities, which aimed to take away retiree benefits. The same Council, responding to a corporate request, also weakened the municipal retail closing by-law against the clear opposition of the RWDSU, the main retail union, and the Sudbury and District Labour Council. Overall, the corporatized view of municipal government as a service-delivery organization to local "customers" has been replacing the concept of municipal government as a centre of democratic political expression and action.

While local labour has resisted numerous elements of globalization, the local business class has accepted and even openly supported the expansion of transnational control from outside the community. In one form or another, its dominant outlook has been "What's good for Inco (or corporate mining) is good for Sudbury." This outlook reflects the trend of growing corporate monopoly together with local business dependency. In earlier decades, the local business class, usually organized through the Board of Trade or Chamber of Commerce or the Conservative or Liberal parties, was relatively larger and included more independent elements. Today the local business class has been so displaced and tied in dependency to transnational corporations through franchising, licencing, and supplier relationships that it is incapable of concerted, independent action in the community interest to curb or reverse transnational domination.

Take a 2006 survey by the City of Greater Sudbury of major employers with 200 or more employees. Of the total 24,370 jobs in twenty-nine operations, 56 percent (in fourteen operations) were in the public sector, such as the Sudbury Regional Hospital, municipal government, and school boards, and this count did not include about 1,500 provincial government employees. Of the rest, 32 percent worked for non-Canadian transnationals (about three-quarters of all private-sector employment, including Inco and Falconbridge), 9 percent worked for non-local Canadian corporations, and only 2 percent worked in locally controlled corporations.<sup>16</sup> Among the twenty-nine operations is a call centre, the new industry most promoted locally as an alternative to mining employment. Tele Tech, the largest private-sector employer outside the mining industry, with about 800 employees, is incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in Colorado, has about 47,000 employees worldwide, and is highly mobile. However, the survey did not include foreign transnationals such as Wal-Mart, the virulently anti-labour American company with assets of over \$40 billion, which already has nearly 200 stores in Canada and 1.4 million employees worldwide. Nor did it include Costco, which, like Wal-Mart, drains retail activity from smaller businesses, with its 374 stores and about 92,000 employees internationally.

The orientation of Sudbury's dependent business class is evident in its economic analyses and policies, particularly in its uncritical acceptance of globalization, with its intensified corporate concentration and resource exploitation. While promoters of globalization and models of intensified competitiveness such as Michael Porter (GSDC 2003) are viewed approvingly, those critical of globalization or who take seriously the international struggles of unions and indigenous peoples for greater local control and public ownership of mining are ignored. Above all, there is a subservient support of corporate mining: "There is no other significant mining region outside of Australia, as welcoming to the mining sector as the City of Greater Sudbury" (CSTF 2006: 7). Issues of Canadian sovereignty and community democracy are secondary to supporting Canadian corporate expansion in Latin America and elsewhere. This is what a 2006 Community Stakeholders' Task Force on the Future of the Local Mining Industry had to say:

It would be preferable to see both companies [Inco and Falconbridge] stay under Canadian ownership; however, Canadian mining, exploration and mining supply and service companies have a major international presence, operating in more than 100 countries around the world.... It is not feasible in the interconnected, global economy not to allow foreign ownership of Canadian assets. (CSTF 2006:13)

These self-serving claims conveniently ignore the reality that some industries in Canada have foreign-ownership and other restrictions, that the ownership of assets and interconnectedness across countries is highly unequal, and that several countries elsewhere are moving toward greater, not less, control of their natural resource industries. Of course, mining is important to Sudbury, but so is a balanced discussion of the mining corporations' real harm to workers and the community, as well as the need for much tougher limits on corporate mining's power and exploitation.

On the crucial question of the distribution of resource profits, or rents, the local elite mentions the need for "resource revenue sharing" (NOLUM 2007; APMMR 2008) and that "[p]eople want a more equitable sharing of the benefits of resource extraction" (CSTF 2006). But the focus is not on greater local or provincial control over industry rents from public resources, or even on compensation for the industry's enormous social or environmental costs. Rather, it is on pleading with provincial and federal governments for a greater share of existing government revenues. However, Ontario provincial mining revenues are low relative to the needs of mining communities, low relative to the social and environmental costs of mining, and low relative to the revenues of the industry.<sup>17</sup> Neo-liberal provincial and federal governments have been lowering the general rates of corporate taxation, including for resource extraction corporations, and this means increased tax pressures at the provincial and federal levels are likely to fall more on personal (worker) income taxes than on corporate ones. Nor is there any questioning of federal or provincial subsidies to the mining industry, estimated at over \$67 million for Ontario in 2000 (Winfield et al. 2002: Ch. 4). In some years, such subsidies exceed royalty revenue.

Recently, Sudbury's municipal property tax collected from Inco and Falconbridge totalled only about \$11 million, or 7 percent of total municipal taxes, which is down from 25 percent a decade ago. Yet Sudbury's new mayor, as reported by Denis St. Pierre, says that he:

does not believe the solution should include taxing underground assets or increasing the overall level of taxation of mining companies, even in boom times such as the current nickel industry supercycle. "I think they do pay healthy taxes.... The issue is getting the other levels of government to share it. (*The Sudbury Star*, Sept. 8, 2007)

The apparent reversal of policy on taxing underground assets of mining corporations, something advocated by Northern mining municipalities for decades, is a

notable step backward, as is the concept that mining is taxed sufficiently. Policy statements don't question their own logic, such as when the City's main strategy document proclaims "Nickel has become the metallic version of oil" (CSTF 2006: 4). When it comes to oil, about 77 percent of the world's hydrocarbon supplies are controlled by national petroleum companies (Séréni 2007), and this will likely increase. Even in Alberta, one of Canada's most right-wing provincial governments saw fit to review its royalties policy. For oil, too, there is debate about "peak oil," yet we hear no concerns that only 100 years of mineral reserves exist in Sudbury. Without a transparent review and increased public capture of resource rents and profits from mining corporations, and without some recognition of the full social costs of mining, communities like Sudbury are unlikely to see the major increases in revenues that are needed.

The current fashion in regional development policy in Sudbury is to create a local mining "cluster" to make Sudbury the "Silicon Valley of the Mining Industry" and Laurentian University a "Harvard" of the mining sector (CSTF 2006). This re-treaded concept aims to concentrate a larger share of mining activities and research in Sudbury to make the region an international pole of attraction for mining. Once again, the role of government is to provide policy and funding support, such as for "centres of excellence," in what is effectively a more aggressive model of state support for corporate mining expansion and globalization. One hears no questioning of how the touted cornucopia of benefits would be shared, how the approach might negatively affect smaller mining communities, or how corporatization damages independent university research and teaching. The analogy to Silicon Valley is not comparable in terms of industrial and technological significance, capital ownership, and the local level of scientific and cultural resources: even leading proponents of clusters warn against overselling their benefits (Wolfe and Gertler 2003).

Such class attitudes and values permeate many areas of local development. For example, municipal planning has been aggressively oriented toward a retrograde corporate developer-driven commercial and residential expansion that encourages wasteful sprawl, suburban malls at the expense of vibrant downtowns, drive-throughs galore, and other practices increasingly discredited for their costly, health-debilitating car dependence. In the case of the Millennium Centre, a major suburban big-box development, the local elite carried out the corporate vision at the expense of small local businesses. As one city official commented:

We aggressively went after big box stores, for example. There were opponents to that. There were people that — downtown merchants, for example — that were opposed to it, people that just didn't want to see us become a big box city, who wanted the mom and pop stores, the small businesses, that kind of thing.<sup>18</sup>

One could go on to other such issues, from transportation to housing to culture. There is hardly a sphere where the anti-working class, anti-female, and anti-environmental bias of the ruling corporate power and policy outlook does not

have an impact. However, two events in recent history are especially telling — Sudbury's twin merger manias.

The first was the 2001 forced amalgamation of the five municipalities surrounding the City of Sudbury into the City of Greater Sudbury (see Table 1 note). Following their 1995 election in Ontario, the Harris Conservatives pursued a stridently pro-corporate platform that featured municipal and school board amalgamation. Taking this opportunity of a rightward lurch in the provincial government, a local group of "concerned citizens" agitated for an amalgamated, single-tier municipality for the Sudbury region. The demand was backed in lemming-like fashion by leading municipal political figures claiming it would bring more efficient and less costly municipal services. The largely foreordained process was conducted under legislation arrogantly named *The Fewer Politicians Act*, 1999 (Sancton 2000: 101–11).

Forced amalgamation was about restricting democracy and centralizing power to cut services. The new municipality of "Greater Sudbury" savagely cut democratically elected representation from sixty-eight to thirteen councillors. The new structure had no authentic democratic basis, whether in a referendum or in a broadly based regional movement. Apart from annihilating meaningful representation for smaller outlying communities, it made election more difficult for candidates with less money or those not favoured by the local corporate media. Forced amalgamation was also a major anti-democratic insult to francophone communities in the region. Unfortunately, francophone corporate-oriented leadership (see Dennie in this volume) largely capitulated. Once the amalgamation was imposed, the promised large savings did not materialize, but centralizing service cuts did occur and the corporate talk of the "customer" started replacing that of the "citizen." As well, the door was opened to "area rating" (differential taxes by neighbourhood) and further inequality within the region. After the provincial Conservatives were driven from office in 2003, the McGinty Liberals added insult to injury by moving to extend municipal councillors' terms from three to four years, thus making municipal political change even more difficult.

The second merger mania featured municipal leaders as passive spectators to a costly global-level corporate struggle for control over the world's nickel mining industry. The main act began in 2005 with Inco proposing to take over Falconbridge (McNish 2006). This massive consolidation would mean more job losses and even greater monopoly power in Sudbury. Yet the municipal council was supine. As Inco's bid proceeded, I personally contacted the two regulatory bodies most involved in reviewing the proposed merger — one relating to competition issues, the other to foreign ownership — both under the federal Minister of Industry. In keeping with how both Conservative and Liberal federal governments have gutted and redefined corporate regulation to favour globalization, monopoly power today is defined so narrowly as to effectively ignore local monopoly effects on the labour market, the media, and some suppliers. Further, I was told there would be no public hearings, even in Sudbury. As for foreign ownership, it

turns out that approval details are secret and whatever limited conditions might be required of the merger are not disclosed publicly by Canadian government officials. I was told explicitly that "we don't do transparency," and so, in order to get information on the government's decision, I had to rely on an Inco press release. I was informed that the Ontario government, now under the McGinty Liberals, had been contacted and voiced no objection to the takeover.<sup>19</sup>

In the end, the sales of Inco to CVRD and of Falconbridge to Xstrata not only ended whatever Canadian ownership and control of the nickel industry remained, it also blew away any pretence of corporate loyalty to the community. The enormous wealth built up for Inco and Falconbridge at great cost to Sudbury was flipped to Brazilian and European capitalists even farther removed from the consequences of their actions. One of the few local business leaders who dared to raise public doubts about the whole process, Michael Aitkins, opined in his *Northern Life* paper on September 6, 2006, that "The sell-out of Sudbury is all over but the whimpering." As for the municipal government of Greater Sudbury, it utterly failed to act independently and decisively to assert a community interest. By the time some critical voices had started to penetrate the corporate fog, it was too late, and politics were reverting to "collaborating with the new owners" and yet another futile "multi-stakeholder" process.

### The Labour Movement

Sudbury is often seen as a "labour town."<sup>20</sup> There is truth to this in terms of Sudbury's class character and rooted union presence, but less so in terms of effective political power, which globalization is making increasingly clear. Still, in what could otherwise be bleak, fatalistic times, the working-class character of Sudbury comes through in the sparks of collective resistance in strikes, demonstrations, popular art, and petitions, as well as in thousands of individual acts of solidarity and protest. This resistance has occurred *despite* the many ways in which the labour movement has been, at times, divided, deflected, and co-opted. The question why, even in such a labour town, power has shifted against workers and how it could change is controversial and requires discussion.

First, the deterioration of labour market conditions since the 1970s, as described earlier, has increased insecurity and disparities among workers. Although this was a major change from the preceding post-war decades with their overall increases in employment, real wages, social programs, and in-migration, the roots of the weakness were present earlier. While the post-war decades in Canada were generally ones of expansion, unemployment was still climbing, as was the disparity between higher paid union jobs and the growing number of lower-paid and minimum-wage jobs (Leadbeater 1992). Since the 1970s, even the stronger unions, such as those in mining, have found it more difficult to bargain a share of their increasing productivity. Wage growth slowed and at times stagnated or fell. The conditions of unorganized and marginalized workers deteriorated even further. So, while workers as a whole were doing worse relative to corporations, disparities among workers also increased. The current nickel boom has not



altered that fundamental pattern, especially as the current higher bonuses and settlements are going to an ever smaller fraction of workers. Pro-corporate and conservative forces used the growing disparities to sow falsehood and division, to blame public-sector workers for conditions of private-sector workers, welfare recipients for causing high taxes, women for taking the jobs of men, francophones for taking the jobs of anglophones, Aboriginal peoples for not paying taxes, immigrants for taking jobs from the Canadian-born, and so on.

Further, social and workplace changes have negatively affected social engagement. While women made progress in job opportunities and greater economic and personal independence, there was no comparable progress in reducing the working week or increasing child-care benefits. Workers today face a much-increased burden of work hours, less free time, and increased stress. Indeed, on-the-job work hours and shift lengths actually increased for some workers. For instance, in 1984, after many decades, Falconbridge was able to increase the eight-hour maximum working day in its surface operations. As well, in many workplaces the pace of work was intensifying under new technology and lean production management strategies, while commuting and shift-work spread in communities. Among the effects of these developments was to make personal and group participation in union and community activities more difficult. Further, there was increased monopolization of mass media, which was already most serious in hinterland communities, restricting parameters of debate, weakening independent working-class culture and education, and encouraging a growing consumerism that dulled class awareness of these changes and of any alternatives to them.

While unions and workers tried to resist several of these negative trends, pro-corporate governments have deployed their power in an increasingly anti-democratic way. Unions face growing government restrictions on organizing, and the right to strike, as well as increased use of state coercion, police power, and violence, which has aided and abetted intensified corporate opposition to worker power and rights (Panitch and Schwartz 2003). This has contributed to a precipitous decline in the percent of workers in unions ("union density"), especially in the private sector. In mining, a traditional bastion of union strength, union density in Ontario in 2003 was only 45.5 percent (personal inquiry to Statistics Canada).

As if weakened labour conditions coupled with increased state and corporate coercion were not enough, Sudbury also has had a political and social history that has weighed heavily on its labour movement. Sudbury was later in achieving successful labour organization than many other mining communities in Canada, and later than Inco's American refining operations in Bayonne, New Jersey. Prior to the 1940s, Inco's firings, ethnic prejudice, company informers, and the social controls of company towns defeated several union efforts to organize Inco. It also gave Sudbury a reputation of being a "scab town." Once legally recognized, Mine Mill Local 598 made enormous progress, not only at the bargaining table, but also in solidarity actions with other unions and in community cultural and

recreational programs. However, Mine Mill Local 598 was also the largest union local in Canada in an industry that was strategic for the American military-industrial complex and, for the establishment, it was disturbingly progressive.

The Pittsburgh-headquartered United Steelworkers of America (USWA) came to Sudbury in the 1950s as part of American-based, continent-wide Cold War union raids to halt Mine Mill's successes and destroy the left-wing union. With the backing of Sudbury's business elite, the francophone elite, the Catholic Church, and Laurentian University, in 1962 the USWA raid succeeded narrowly in taking over Mine Mill at Inco, while the latter retained bargaining rights for hourly rated workers at Falconbridge. The USWA raids were the single most divisive action in the history of the working class in Sudbury, with an impact far beyond the city and those years.<sup>21</sup> The division has since narrowed, and the two unions have often supported each other in strikes and negotiations. In 1993, Mine Mill/CAW Local 598 at Falconbridge, after affiliating with the Canadian Autoworkers Union, joined the Sudbury and District Labour Council and was again in the same labour central as the USWA and Inco workers.

But the raids (or "the split" as it is also called) did not end the division between the Steelworker and Mine Mill unions, nor did it end left-right struggles within each union. Within the USWA, the progressive tradition reasserted itself in Sudbury when Dave Patterson, a young and radical activist, was elected President of Local 6500. Patterson led the local in its longest and most difficult strike against Inco, in 1978–79. With or without the raids, the strike and Inco's job cuts put in focus the exploitative nature of corporate mining and raised again the question of nationalization of nickel (Tester 1994: 100–102). The struggle between capital and labour was fundamental and incessant. As Patterson himself noted "the struggle continued after the split for both locals" (Swift 1977: 11).

Within both unions there existed two opposed approaches to unionism and corporate capitalism, often called "social unionism" and "business unionism." Social unionism emphasizes unions as a movement of the entire working class for social change, a high level of rank-and-file participation, union democracy, external organizing, and actions not only for its own members but for all workers wherever solidarity is needed. It also is more critical of corporate collaboration and capitalism. The Western Federation of Miners, who created the labour slogan, "An Injury to One is an Injury to All," embodied a strong anti-capitalist social unionism, which was carried into the Mine Mill union. By contrast, business unionism has more limited social goals (a "pure and simple" unionism), a narrower focus on the interests of its own members alone, a lesser role for rank-and-file participation, and an acceptance of collaboration with employers and of capitalism. During the Cold War, with its anti-communist expulsions and witch hunts and growing economic prosperity, business unionism achieved dominance in most unions in Canada, and even more so in the United States and in American-based unions: "Business values predominated, and unions were seen as institutions (businesses) providing special services to members (a contract, contract enforcement) for a fee (dues)" (Nissen 2003: 138). The rank-and-file

and "movement" character of unions declined and was replaced primarily by a "servicing model." The self-concept of the leaders of the Steelworkers union is a type of social unionism, though the union's actual practices have tended to be more conservative and business-unionist than Mine Mill. This is reinforced by the more conservative pattern of unionism in its American base over the last half century.

The Patterson period reflected a major upsurge in militancy and offered the possibility of a change in direction for the labour movement in Sudbury and beyond. However, the shift in union leadership was short-lived, as the right-wing union staff led by Leo Gerard isolated and defeated Patterson. The return to business unionism at USWA Local 6500 was followed by a long-term decline in union activity, further corporate collaboration, and increased local division (see McKiegan and Mulroy in this volume). One serious consequence was that the labour movement was unable to unify around a strong common policy and program of action to confront the massive job cuts at Inco and Falconbridge during the 1980s and 1990s. Downsizing became acceptable if corporations did it by "attrition" (not replacing those retiring or leaving their position). While better than outright layoffs, this situation did not help younger workers or the community, and it gave legitimacy to Inco's and Falconbridge's dumping of their social costs onto the community.

During this period, the general character of Sudbury's labour movement was changing, particularly with the growth of public-sector union membership, such as in the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), and with a much larger number of unionized women workers (see Closs in this volume). In 2003, about 36 percent, or 27,000, Sudbury workers were unionized within 224 bargaining units (Whynott 2003). The sectors with the highest unionization rates still included mining, but now also health, social services, education, and public administration. Among unions, the largest was still the USWA (including its non-mining locals), but they were now both absolutely and relatively smaller, at 22.5 percent of union members, while CUPE was the second-largest at 18.1 percent. Union members are about evenly split between the private and public sectors, with the latter including many blue-collar as well as white- and pink-collar workers. Since the 1990s, the main labour central in Sudbury, the Sudbury and District Labour Council, was joined, not only by Mine Mill, but also by two teachers' unions, the Laurentian University faculty union, and the nurses' union. Positively, no single union or sector had the numbers or authority to dictate its views and the internecine tumult of the period of the raids was fading. However, some of the old left-right divisions still erupt in new forms.

One of the most visible clashes developed in 1993 over the provincial NDP's Social Contract legislation, which was fiercely resisted by public-sector unions and Mine Mill/CAW, but supported by the more conservative Steelworkers and other so-called "pink paper" unions (Reshef and Rastin 2003). Then

came the "Days of Action" in 1996. The public-sector unions and Mine Mill, making up a majority of the Labour Council, backed the Days of Action, but the Steelworkers pulled out and did not support it. Then came the corporate merger mania of 2005–06. When Inco proposed its takeover of Falconbridge, the Steelworker leadership lined up to support Inco and was clearly enthused by the prospect of taking over Mine Mill members at Falconbridge. Not only did the top Steelworker leaders start commenting aggressively about how the USW (the United Steelworkers of America in Canada dropped the "America" from its name in 2005) would be a better union for Mine Mill workers, but they also claimed to establish "a Steelworker Inco/Falconbridge Council to advance our building power program."<sup>22</sup> The Mine Mill/CAW union urged caution and questioned whether community benefits were being protected in the proposed Inco merger, and it also began to hoist its flag as a Canadian union (in contrast to the American-based Steelworkers). For a period, the possibility of a destructive replay of the raids hung over the Sudbury labour movement. More loyal to profits, Inco soon jilted the Steelworkers, first in a plan to merge with Phelps-Dodge, a company infamous among American mine workers (Rosenblum 1998), and then in folding for even more money from Brazil-based CVRD.

Such divisions in the labour movement are likely to continue, even though they have little member support, until another progressive upsurge like the one represented by Patterson can compel steps forward. The current mindset and organization of much union leadership were largely formed in a period of capitalist expansion and prosperity. Economic and environmental conditions have changed dramatically, though the thinking at the top of the labour movement has not, and not only in the USW. As working people see the need for stronger policies to confront corporate power and globalization, one might expect to see new debates and changes in power unseen before in Sudbury. As part of developing a new labour strategy, some policy and organizational divisions of the past need to be addressed. Labour policy directions could include:

- a progressive economic and regional policy for hinterland areas to protect, improve, and expand jobs, social programs, environmental conditions, and community participation, all anchored around greater public ownership and community control of natural resources;
- support for the multinational character of Canada, particularly the collective rights of Aboriginal and francophone minorities, as well as the rights and contributions of immigrants. Dealing with language and cultural issues within unions is part of the question, but so is local solidarity against the forced amalgamation of francophone communities into Sudbury or the City Council's insulting flag debates;
- completing the desegregation of male-dominated workplaces and unions, as well as strengthening protections against discrimination and harassment of all kinds, including those based on disability, age, sexual orientation, or race. Sexism, homophobia, racism, and ableism are part of the package of



- right-wing ideology and power used to provoke deflecting issues and divide collective action;
- democratization of the mass media and greater access to non-commercial culture, education, and training, which is crucial for a sustained development of critical awareness, solidarity, and alternative directions in community development;
- a policy for peaceful uses of metals and against the support of militarism. Metals are as basic to war as water is to agriculture. No labour movement with any international perspective can avoid issues now generated by the increased destructiveness of war and the role of mining transnationals in support of brutal militarist regimes internationally.

The organizational direction of a new labour strategy must also address the need for a single industrial union in mining that adopts the perspective of social unionism and is headquartered in a hinterland city. The new union could be independent of both the USW and Mine Mill/CAW, centred on mining workers but also including groups of workers related industrially or geographically to hinterland areas. Local and international solidarity and affiliations would be basic, but not the concept that sees ever-larger unions and international bargaining as its main strategy to deal with transnational corporations. Within Canada, organizing the unorganized and winning company-wide and industry-wide bargaining would be major goals. The possibility of these and other policy and organizational goals are a key part of the need for discussions and actions to build greater unity in mining communities and hinterland regions against corporate globalization. Each mining and resource community and hinterland region has its particulars, but the anti-labour and anti-community consequences of globalization are a shared experience.

### Which Future?

Two seemingly opposed views now dominate thinking about the future prospects of Sudbury and other mining communities. The first view foresees continual growth in population and employment, at least following a period of restructuring or temporary decline. The second view foresees inevitable decline, perhaps to a more stable, lower level. However, both views accept corporate globalization, and neither treats seriously its impoverishing effects on community conditions, democracy, or the environment. For working people, this is another Hobson's choice.

The continual growth view is typical of the local business class and commercial media. Often larded with boosterism, the central belief is that growth will happen through more pro-corporate policies, incentives, and values, particularly focussed on even more aggressive corporate and community competitiveness (such as through a mining cluster policy). Community-building and the role of local government is reduced to or rationalized as competitiveness-building, whether in social and labour policy, education, sports, or culture. Advocates of

this view often preach about working in "partnership" with transnationals to revitalize community prospects without questioning whether corporate domination is itself a major part of the problem.

In a more thoughtful expression of the growth view, Saarinen (1992) has argued that by the middle and late 1980s Sudbury had overcome the mining staple trap and shifted toward self-sustainability through diversification in health, education, tourism, and administrative sectors: "Once known only as a resource community, it has since developed as a major regional service centre for north-eastern Ontario" (Saarinen 1992: 182). True, increases in public-sector and services employment have been significant, though there were also cuts (Table 2 and Closs in this volume). However, this has not meant a shift beyond mining dependency nor to self-sustained growth, let alone to more social equality. Sudbury has a higher, not lower, level of social-program dependency and the overall employment rate has fallen. And, Natural Resources Canada's estimate of mining employment income at 44 percent of total income illustrates that mining is still by far the most important sector apart from the public sector.

The second view of Sudbury's future foresees population and employment decline. Arguably, this is the dominant view, though it is not publicized in senior levels of the Canadian state, whose policies encourage metropolitanization and that for decades have been content to manage decline, largely ignoring numerous reports on conditions of mining towns (Leadbeater 1998). In one of the clearest decline positions, Polèse and Shearmur (2006) argue that decline is inevitable in regions outside major metropolitan areas.<sup>23</sup> Given that total population growth in Canada is close to zero, they argue that achieving population growth in particular regions (like Sudbury) is a zero-sum game that depends on attracting migrants and immigrants from other areas. This in turn depends mainly on the distribution of employment opportunities across regions of Canada. Because of the structural trend of increasing employment in major metropolitan areas, the situation of hinterland areas cannot be "easily altered by public policy" and "it is unreasonable to expect local economic development strategies to halt decline" (Polèse and Shearmur 2006: 24). Polèse and Shearmur see Northern Ontario (including Sudbury) as limited by distance from major markets and by resource conditions. They reject the idea that new information technologies (IT) will overcome the costs of distance, because IT has not been shown in practice to reduce the need for face-to-face contacts, nor to have much effect on transportation costs. Contrary to much local economic development practice, they refuse to blame the lack of local growth on a lack of social capital or local entrepreneurship: this idea is "not only misleading, but may be counterproductive" (Polèse and Shearmur 2006: 43). The key policy problem becomes "devising positive decline strategies" to a new, lower equilibrium size (Polèse and Shearmur 2006: 44).

Neither the decline nor growth views capture the depth of the developmental crisis confronting hinterland areas. On the one hand, the growth view emphasizes a type of corporate competition that reverts inevitably to reducing



labour costs (whether reducing jobs, job quality, pay, or benefits) or to increasing government subsidization of capital's costs (such as deregulation, free-trade zones, tax concessions, or higher tuition costs). In other words, it proposes even greater redistribution to capital and more social disparity. On the other hand, the notion that there might exist some lower and socially positive equilibrium in population or employment is delusional about the capitalist adjustment process. Decline in mining communities is strongly associated with lower incomes, more unemployment and poverty, and further polarization of income and wealth. The decline view is disempowering in that it offers little more than lower incomes, more poverty, fewer local opportunities, and reduced expectations. While growth hardly trickles down to the majority, decline usually makes conditions even worse.

Both the growth and decline views avoid other major issues, such as sustainability in resource extraction and use. Increased investment in mining and more rapid rates of resource exhaustion and use are not sustainable in the long term, especially given the tendency for shorter durations of mine life, the reduced likelihood of finding new large-scale ore bodies, and growing global environmental concerns. Unaddressed too is continued metropolitanization. A complex range of federal and provincial policies, dominated by a metro-centric outlook, have reinforced this trend, despite its enormous social and environmental costs.

As for the issue of growth or decline, there can be no resolution unless a far greater emphasis is placed on living standards and the distributional consequences and fairness of particular forms of community development. In the short term, efforts need to focus on protecting existing jobs, living standards, social programs, and community rights in the face of the impoverishing pressures of globalization. A labour-oriented perspective tends to measure developmental success by higher rates of employment, reduced poverty, stronger social protections, and a broader sharing of productivity gains and resource rents, through governmental as well as union action. If communities could achieve much higher rates of employment and job quality, stronger social protections, and more equitable sharing of the costs of adjustment, some shrinking — or increases — in population, or even employment, would not be so critical.

The central economic issue for the future of mining-dependent communities like Sudbury still remains: how and by whom are resources to be owned, controlled, and developed? The combined economic, environmental, and political crises require a break with the policies of corporate globalization. Corporate mining has demonstrated vividly that corporate ownership does not assure social responsibility or stewardship of the resource. As Blackmar (2005: 98) comments: "Absentee ownership gives lie to property rights advocates' invocation of stewardship of the land as a feature of proprietorship." With globalization removing power even further from the people of hinterland communities — those most directly affected — the time has come for a renewed demand for greater public ownership and community control of mining and mineral resources, for a major portion of resource rents for hinterland regions, and for a planned use

of resources that protects future as well as present generations. Such a demand needs to go further than the pattern with earlier state mining companies — such as in coal or asbestos — that too often were formed to remediate and rationalize corporate failure and that often aped the environmental and social practices of private corporations.

Stronger elements of democratization and accountability are crucial for the future, including a legislated role for mining communities in the long-term planning of resource development and the monitoring of environmental and health impacts. Other related measures would include full public disclosure and independent verification of reserves; public setting of rates of exhaustion and protections against high-grading; inventory planning to modulate boom and bust cycles; prioritizing of recycling, waste reduction, and sustainable uses to minimize use of remaining resources; gradual incorporation of the full costing of environmental and social costs of mining; and regulatory support for the higher metals prices that full costing would entail.

A shift toward the economic and social rights of hinterland regions would also be an important step toward more peaceful and equitable relations among countries. Mining has long had, and continues to have, an association with empire, oppression, and war, from gold and silver in the conquest, to colonization and enslavement of the “New World” and Africa, to oil and diamonds in the current bloodshed in the Middle East and Africa. There is a need to work toward an international treaty prohibiting extraterritorial ownership of resource lands and mineral rights, including leases and joint-production sharing arrangements, together with a greater emphasis on regional self-sufficiency in resource use. The positive contributions of mining experience in engineering, geology, production, and remediation could continue to develop and be used through fair exchange and mutually beneficial cooperation in consulting, technology transfer, and international training and research projects and institutions. Ultimately, mining does *not* need to continue under the control and in the form of transnational corporations: resources *can* be used more rationally for present and future generations in ways that help to overcome international inequalities, rather than to exploit and aggravate them.

For Sudbury and other hinterland communities, there will have to be much stronger requirements set on mining operations, as well as ongoing regulation to retain and develop refining, secondary industrial linkages, and research. Provincial action is needed for an independent public investigation, free of corporate interest or pressures, of community health issues. As well, more open and rigorous monitoring of soil, water, air, and other environmental conditions are called for. Equally, the social character of mining must change, especially with decisive steps in hiring and promotion of women and other equity groups, because corporate mining has shown itself, over many decades, to be unwilling to desegregate its workplaces. There must be government-enforced measures — in cooperation with the unions — in areas ranging from equity quotas to reductions in the working week to family- and community-friendly shifts and workplace policies.

Many aspects of mining communities need changing, from town planning to food systems to democratizing mass media to cultural policy to the national question. But the key to achieving such changes lies in transforming the mining industry itself. Much of what needs to be done is already known. A raft of progressive policies is available from mining and other hinterland unions, as well as from numerous studies.<sup>24</sup> Many other policies and initiatives will evolve through the skills and enormous creativity of working people that a progressive reorientation of the industry would create. Mining communities *do* have real choices available, at least once it has been decided they have had enough of corporate globalization.

### Notes

1. Of course, these indicators can and have been criticized as rough and biased, which they are. But the bias usually understates the problems, especially by their general exclusion of distributional measures, including disparities relating to class, gender, age, disability, race, and language. For some local views, in a framework of community competitiveness, see GSDC 2003 and Robinson 2003.
2. The definition for 2001 is based on 30 percent or more of employment income from mining or other resource industry relative to total income, including transfer income. The 44 percent figure is from a personal communication with Natural Resources Canada. The employment figure for the mining industry here is defined to include mining (6.4 percent) plus, generously, all manufacturing (6.4 percent) (see Table 2 for 2001). The latter includes smelting and refining. Most mining communities are characterized by Stage I (Primary) or Stage 2 (Smelting and Refining), or both, in Natural Resources Canada's four-stage classification of the mining production process: the other two stages are of semi-fabricated and fabricated products.
3. Using data from the 1980s, one study for Northern Ontario has estimated that for every \$100 of output in mining, about \$24.16 went to wages and salaries and \$24.19 went to purchases of inputs in other industries (or "backward linkages") in Ontario (Jankowski and Moazzami 1993: 42-45). The other industries include travel and advertising (\$0.94), maintenance and support (\$3.50), services (\$3.18), electric power (\$3.16), transportation and storage (\$1.42), repair and construction (\$1.73), chemicals (\$2.65), gasoline and fuel (\$1.57), machinery (\$2.66), iron and steel (\$0.73), mining services (\$1.71), non-metallic minerals (\$0.50), and natural gas (\$.045).
4. Assuming the above Natural Resources Canada estimate of 44 percent resource-export dependence, Sudbury's base multiplier would be about 2.3 or lower, given leakages.
5. The growing body of research on the relation of women and men in mining, and in mining communities, includes Forestell (1999), Kechnie and Reitsma-Street (1996), Klubock (1996), Peck (1993), Seager and Perry (1997), Tallichet (1995), and Yount (2005).
6. From Inco's 2005 SEC report (accessed May 2007 at <<http://www.inco.com/investorinfo>>). This is a report required by the American government, which has stronger corporate reporting requirements than Canada. Estimates of economic rents and their flows are made difficult in part because much corporate cost, revenue, and ownership information remains proprietary. This is yet another reflection of the fact that pro-corporate federal and provincial governments have been unwilling to

take action to protect public rights in natural resources, particularly in the interests of mining communities.

7. The review, which included oil-extraction, compared strictly non-metropolitan mining regions to other non-metropolitan regions. About half of all published findings showed negative economic outcomes, with those remaining divided between favourable and neutral/indeterminate outcomes. The limited positive outcomes were more associated with incomes than with unemployment rates or poverty, with the western United States (relatively large new coal strip mines), and with years prior to 1982. The observation of higher average or median income, together with higher unemployment or poverty, is consistent with a point I will make later — that among the impacts of resource-export development is that it typically increases socioeconomic inequality.
8. Methodologically, longer-term patterns can be obscured in narrowly cross-sectional studies, which are usually based on data for a single year of the evolution of an industry, region, or community. Cross-sectional studies have also tended to favour the use of mean (average) and median values in variables, rather than distributional impacts or structural trends, and they have avoided measures of what is sometimes called the economic “adjustment process.” Longer-term historical and longitudinal studies can give a clearer picture of the consequences of the resource-extraction cycle and development arc of resource-dependent local development.
9. “Bosses roamed the working places with ‘blue slips,’ termination notices, and issued them as they wished. The whip of speed-up cracked all around harried workers, accidents and fatalities were plentiful, while ‘stool pigeons’ and informers kept the Company informed in the fight to keep unionism off the mines and plants” (Brasch 1997: 18). Among other actions against growing union support, Inco funded a divisive company union, dubbed the “Nickel Rash.” Inco was widely believed to be behind the February 1942 attack by a dozen goons who destroyed the Mine Mill office and seriously assaulted two union officers (Solski and Smaller 1985: 103–105). On ethnic and occupational segregation and corporate control through housing in the Inco company town of Copper Cliff, see Goltz 1992.
10. According to Norden (1970, accessed May 2007 at <<http://shunpiking.com>>): “At the Nuremberg trial against the IG Farben directors, the court confirmed that the International Nickel Company of Canada (Inco), which controls 85 percent of the nickel production in the capitalist world, delivered nickel to the Hitlerite state for political-military reasons. On 29 September 1947, in the course of the trial, a declaration of the accused director, Paul Haffiger, was read out which stated that in 1934, that is to say, one year after Hitler’s rise to power, a treaty was signed between IG Farben and the nickel trust which permitted IG Farben to cover a good half of the German needs with only 50 per cent of the costs paid in foreign currency. In addition IG Farben AG was able to have the nickel trust stockpile a substantial supply of nickel in Germany at its expense.”
11. For example, Swift 1977. Blocked by the corporate-controlled mass media, expressions of international solidarity have been most visible on the Internet, for example, on the Mines and Communities Website or, for Canada, the webpages of Mining Watch Canada or the international pages and links of several unions including the CLC/CTC, CAW, and Steelworkers.
12. Challenges are also coming from Canadian and American activists: “We asked questions about well documented abuses related to Inco’s operations in the 1970s and early 1980s: community social disruption; lack of consultation with local com-



- munities; forced relocation of communities; Inco's infamous relationship with the military; repression in Guatemala City against activists and academics criticizing the country's fire sale of mining concessions; repression against local activists in the El Estor region; low profile remittances to the local government; etc." Accessed February 2007 at <<http://web.unbc.ca/geography/whatsnew/guatemala2004/photoessay.html>>. See also Gedicks 2001.
13. In terms of mining in Canada, the total employment in mineral industries rose from its 1941 wartime peak of nearly 56,000 to over 86,000 in the early 1970s, while coal mining employment declined almost continuously from its peak levels in the 1920s of over 30,000 to less than 9,000 by the early 1970s (Leacy 1983: P15, Q13). In terms of employment in metal mining alone, and excluding smelting and refining, employment reached a peak about 1974 at around 70,000. By 2000 it had plummeted by more than a half to under 28,000 (NRC 2006a: Table 23).
  14. On the strike, see Grylls and Kuyek in this volume. See also Macdonald and Chammas (2001), Lowe (2001), and Beck et al. (2005). At the time, Falconbridge was owned 55 percent by Noranda, which was in turn owned 40 percent by Brascan. CBC News, Feb. 21, 2001, reported Falconbridge's \$30 million claim. The actual figure is likely higher.
  15. The unadjusted average for Sudbury in 2003 was \$29,000, indicating stagnant money earnings. A similar pattern occurred with Sudbury's median wage and salary income, which in 1993 was \$23,300, above the medians for Ontario and Canada. But in 2003 the Sudbury median, even unadjusted for inflation, had dropped to \$20,000, well below the median for Ontario and Canada. The inflation adjustment uses the annual Consumer Price Index (2002=100) of Statistics Canada. The wage and salary data used here, as well as on distributive measures and for the economic dependency data above, was retrieved through special orders with Statistics Canada's Small Area and Administrative Data Division. The analysis of mine wages is based here on Mine Mill contracts, which is complicated by strike and lockout time lost, COLA adjustments, productivity and nickel bonuses, and overtime earnings. The last of these probably declined over much of the period, but has increased in the recent nickel boom, bringing some catch-up for unionized mine workers, though less than would previously have been shared of productivity gains.
  16. The last were two contracting or construction companies heavily dependent on mining and the public sector. Survey accessed July 2007 at <[www.city.greatersudbury.on.ca/keyfacts](http://www.city.greatersudbury.on.ca/keyfacts)>.
  17. Ontario's taxes on mining lands (leases, licences of occupation, and patents) are minimal, only about \$1.7 million on 675,395 hectares in Ontario in 2007, of which the Territorial District of Sudbury returned about \$713,000 (personal communication with the provincial Department of Northern Development and Mines). Ontario's Mining Profits Tax on profits in excess of \$500,000 returned only about \$52 million in 2006 for the entire province, which has the most mining in Canada, and Ontario's entire revenue from the mining industry was said by the industry itself to be around \$180 million in 2005 (NOLUM 2007). For Inco alone in 2005, for example, reported net sales were US\$4,518 million and net earnings US\$836 million, for a return on equity of 17 percent. In 2005, Sudbury accounted for 52.7 percent of Inco's world annual mine production. Some infrastructural costs of mining are noted in APMMR 2008.
  18. Personal communication with Laura Schatz, from interview as part of research for Schatz and Johnson (2007).

19. By contrast, the Mine Mill/CAW union published a booklet calling for a review and particular conditions for any merger plan, including local government approval, to ensure benefits for workers, communities, and Canada. It noted some of the self-serving corporate greed in the process, for example, the 2004 corporate pay of Inco Chief Executive, Scott Hand, at \$5.36 million, and of Falconbridge Chief Executive Derek Pannell at \$4.98 million. This included stock options that would give them an interest in engineering financial deals that would bring higher share prices even if gains are short-lived (CAW 2006).
20. In this chapter, the term "labour" has two main meanings, at times overlapping, distinguished by the context. The first, which is my preferred use, refers broadly to workers (employees) or the working class, or in an economic context to labour as opposed to capital. In the second, labour refers more narrowly to unions or unionized workers. The active movement for worker rights and union organization is often referred to as the "labour movement," which can include workers whether in unions or outside them.
21. Labour activists and historians continue to study "the raids" in Sudbury as among the most momentous events in labour history. On the history of Mine Mill and the raids, from persons with local Mine Mill experience, see Lang (1970), Solski and Smaller (1985), Tester (1980), and Stevenson (1993). A pro-Steelworker view is found in Southern (1982) and Gilchrist (1999). See also Arnopoulos (1982: Chapter 7), Laite (1985), and Steedman et al. (1995). Among others, the work of Mercier (1999) on the Steelworker raids in Montana provides useful parallels.
22. USW Canada press release, Dec. 7, 2005. The USW was likely assuming that, in a combined vote of the two locals, the much larger USW Local 6500 would outvote Mine Mill even if, as most observers believe, a large majority of Mine Mill members would prefer Mine Mill over the USW. Either the USW leadership understood this situation and disregarded the views of Mine Mill members or it overestimated USW support, including in its own union. Whatever, this was not a democratic or progressive way to heal wounds or to turn what was potentially a brutally divisive struggle into something constructive.
23. For Polèse and Shearmur, who use a centre-periphery concept, central urban regions have a minimum threshold of 500,000 people. Saarinen (1992: 175) considers 250,000 "the population size often considered necessary for self-sustainability." In both analyses, the Sudbury area, even at roughly 160,000 people, is well below these somewhat arbitrary thresholds.
24. In Canada, union policies on mining and mining communities have not been centrally collected but are available over the decades in resolutions, convention minutes, press releases, policy brochures, and, now, union websites. For studies, see also, for example, Tanzer (1980: Chapter 19), Leadbeater (1998), Winfield et al. (2002), Kuyek and Coumans (2003), and Sampat (2003).



# Sudbury Sleep

Kate Leadbeater

The daycares spoke two languages  
in the place that I left. The streets echoed  
strange with the lonely noises of pocket change  
and pick-up trucks. Winter was unforgiving as hell.

Santa Claus men with calloused hands  
and union bellies cradled Bell Canada  
telephones between their stocky shoulders  
and thawing ears, trying humanly hard not  
to hear the credit card sounds of Christmas.

They were deaf, I thought.

In the place that I left, wildcat words danced  
often on the radio, the thumping fists of collective  
agreements shook snow from trees' branches  
and promised new teeshirts dressed in bright block-letter  
acronyms. Letters that would've crushed my soaring  
pre-teen heart, had I known the weight of them.

I was eighteen when I left.

I left in favour of taller things, brighter  
People with properly thought out plans  
Of attack. Libraries like neighbourhoods.

I had more to say, I thought. More to say  
for myself and my cervix than cancer. More  
to know than a hard luck, hardrock town.

And as I scrubbed myself clean of my history,  
gathered my most urban parts and boarded the Greyhound  
bus, I secretly wished they had screamed:

*we know*

*the sky is black here, like a Milne watercolour in a gallery  
too small for its city but it is well-intentioned like the rest of us,  
tired and trying like the rest of us, in the stormy epilogues  
of sunlight our queens and our men (jokers all of them) seek to*

*invade some warmer place decked in brightly coloured lights  
but those city signs will not trick us, friend,*

*will not have us*

*believe*

*that we've arrived. We know better, the rest of us, having been  
deprived, having tried the honest costume and having been  
discovered in the most painful circumstance (bare) and so we plead*

*stay, friend*

*together we will afford the rest of them no grace and no advance  
we will orchestrate this war from beneath our birth-town black skies  
and we will be victorious, friend, together we will swell and fade  
victorious, the guilty blood of our slashed and borrowed futures  
testifying to our glory, testifying to a breed of success*

*so long-since lived as to be foreign,*

*together*

*we, the trampled spirits of our generation will know  
an honest celebration, will know the caves we have built  
in these afterthought years, bound and blistered by this Progress  
(and what should follow) only we will know the brick to lay,  
the pride and secret, the dry slag-filled breath*

*and at last*

*they*

*will see that we've kept at bay the demons of our black skies  
for one day, more, fighting with the cruel vigour of orphaned warriors  
the sparkle of our unborn babes sharpening our dirty blades*

*o friend, hear our cry*

But instead, they told me it was best. Ushered me to the city limits,  
where evergreens screeched — in a single lonely language — that I  
would never wake rested from Sudbury sleep.

I was eighteen when I left.

(2007)



**S**udbury is the largest hardrock mining centre in North America and among the largest in the world. Given the enormous mineral wealth that exists in the Sudbury Basin, one might think that prosperity would abound, and that cultural, educational, health and social-welfare institutions would be of the highest order, existing within a well-maintained and attractive physical infrastructure. But this is not the Sudbury that people know. This book explores key aspects of Sudbury's economic, health and social conditions. It analyzes how globalization and corporate power in a hinterland mining town have impacted on working people, how and why resistance has emerged, and why alternative directions are needed. While Sudbury is the focus of this book, the Sudbury experience offers important lessons for other mining and resource communities.

**D**AVID LEADBEATER is an Associate Professor of Economics at Laurentian University in Sudbury.

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